標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions; Michael Bacharach (Professor of Economics and Dire Book 1997 Kluwer Academic Publis [打印本頁] 作者: proptosis 時間: 2025-3-21 19:53
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作者: 施舍 時間: 2025-3-21 21:18
A Complete Epistemic Logic for Multiple Agentsne hand models an idealized notion of knowledge (the epistemic agent is assumed to be fully introspective, for example, and 55 knowledge also suffers from the problem of logical omniscience—the agent knows all logical validities, and his knowledge is closed under logical consequence— see Wansing, 19作者: Panther 時間: 2025-3-22 02:26
Eliminating Redundancies in Partition Spaces Aumann (1976). In these models the uncertainty of agents is about a space of points, which are called states of the world. Each such state stands for a combination of physical, environmental parameters — the state of nature, and possible mutual uncertainties of the agents over these parameters. The作者: 錯誤 時間: 2025-3-22 05:06 作者: HAWK 時間: 2025-3-22 10:04 作者: groggy 時間: 2025-3-22 14:55 作者: groggy 時間: 2025-3-22 21:00 作者: ARBOR 時間: 2025-3-22 22:41
Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games is her turn to move, etc. It is not, however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural statements that one can make (about a given extensive game) whose truth cannot be decided without making the language richer. We shall give two examples. Consider first the 作者: 莎草 時間: 2025-3-23 02:43 作者: AMBI 時間: 2025-3-23 06:08
The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game It sets out to do three things: to provide an introduction to epistemic logic for decision theorists (Section 2);. to give a formulation in epistemic logic of the structure of a theory of a game (Sections 3 and 4); and to apply methods of epistemic logic to define some possible strategies for deali作者: GILD 時間: 2025-3-23 12:12 作者: 死貓他燒焦 時間: 2025-3-23 15:25 作者: Barter 時間: 2025-3-23 20:36
Anupam Datta,Somesh Jha,Thomas Repshat a model characterizes a knowledge base if everything which follows from it is true in the model, and .. Likewise, a query can be answered by checking whether a related proposition is true in the model. Since (at least for human reasoners) model checking is a relatively simple activity, the method is quite appealing.作者: arthroscopy 時間: 2025-3-23 23:21 作者: 六邊形 時間: 2025-3-24 03:08
Daizhan Cheng,Hongsheng Qi,Zhiqiang Litionality: a mathematical definition intended to make precise the informal notion of rationality that is appropriate for the situation in which rational agents interact in the way specified in the theoretical description of the game.作者: Additive 時間: 2025-3-24 07:37 作者: certitude 時間: 2025-3-24 12:27 作者: 取回 時間: 2025-3-24 16:38 作者: 依法逮捕 時間: 2025-3-24 22:16 作者: Perigee 時間: 2025-3-25 01:07 作者: HUMP 時間: 2025-3-25 07:10 作者: slipped-disk 時間: 2025-3-25 08:48
Encyclopaedia of Mathematical Sciences a combination of physical, environmental parameters — the state of nature, and possible mutual uncertainties of the agents over these parameters. These uncertainties are expressed by a partition each agent has over the states of the world: every partition member contains all those states the agent conceives as possible when one of them prevails.作者: Detain 時間: 2025-3-25 14:13
Analysis and Continuum Mechanicsons of modern game theory equip it to fulfil this project. We present an impossibility result which concerns the extent to which they can do so. The result can be seen as strengthening a claim established by B?rgers and Samuelson (1992) and Samuelson (1992).作者: MIR 時間: 2025-3-25 19:53 作者: 颶風(fēng) 時間: 2025-3-25 20:49 作者: legislate 時間: 2025-3-26 03:55 作者: observatory 時間: 2025-3-26 05:42 作者: 支架 時間: 2025-3-26 09:36
Signals and Communication Technology, and the subject not only does not see it or hear it etc.; but what is more, he does not even think of the possibility that it might: fact . is not present to the subject’s mind. What is an appropriate formal model for this story?作者: antidepressant 時間: 2025-3-26 14:50
Studies in Computational Intelligenceerize common knowledge when belief is defined as belief with probability one. But when individuals are not assumed to be expected utility maximizers, what is the appropriate analogous definition of full belief? Let us illustrate the importance of this issue by two examples.作者: 無王時期, 時間: 2025-3-26 17:57 作者: 使聲音降低 時間: 2025-3-27 01:02
Michael Bacharach (Professor of Economics and Dire作者: obtuse 時間: 2025-3-27 04:04 作者: 毀壞 時間: 2025-3-27 08:06 作者: invert 時間: 2025-3-27 11:19 作者: 倒轉(zhuǎn) 時間: 2025-3-27 17:09
Anupam Datta,Somesh Jha,Thomas Repscient computation. The logical models in question represent knowledge bases, a knowledge base being a set of facts known to some agent (e.g., the actual knowledge of a player in a game). Any piece of information contained in a knowledge base is verified by the corresponding model. The objective is n作者: 書法 時間: 2025-3-27 17:51
Signals and Communication Technologytes of the world, . and .. At . a certain fact . happens — it is true — and the subject sees it or hears it or anyhow perceives it, so that he knows it is true (in Geanakoplos [5] the subject is Sherlock Holmes’ assistant and fact . is ‘the dog barks’). At state . fact . does not occur (it is false)作者: 情感脆弱 時間: 2025-3-28 01:04 作者: HEPA-filter 時間: 2025-3-28 02:55 作者: Barrister 時間: 2025-3-28 06:30
Erik Cuevas,Omar Avalos,Jorge Gálvez is her turn to move, etc. It is not, however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural statements that one can make (about a given extensive game) whose truth cannot be decided without making the language richer. We shall give two examples. Consider first the 作者: Vo2-Max 時間: 2025-3-28 12:40 作者: heterogeneous 時間: 2025-3-28 17:55 作者: 不利 時間: 2025-3-28 20:17
Daizhan Cheng,Hongsheng Qi,Zhiqiang Li any game the strategies that might be chosen by rational and intelligent players who know the structure of the game, and who recognize each other’s rationality and knowledge. The problem was not to find the set of strategies that satisfied some independent characterization of rationality and intell作者: 服從 時間: 2025-3-29 00:08
Series and Integral Representations,owing an equally well-received (albeit questionable) view, a known event must be true. Hence the standard definition of . (CK), as perhaps first introduced by Lewis (1969) and as formalized in Aumann’s (1976) classic paper: an event is said to be CK if it is true, every individual in the group knows it, etc.作者: 淡紫色花 時間: 2025-3-29 03:49 作者: 獨(dú)裁政府 時間: 2025-3-29 07:55
On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledgeowing an equally well-received (albeit questionable) view, a known event must be true. Hence the standard definition of . (CK), as perhaps first introduced by Lewis (1969) and as formalized in Aumann’s (1976) classic paper: an event is said to be CK if it is true, every individual in the group knows it, etc.作者: Forsake 時間: 2025-3-29 12:25
Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games is her turn to move, etc. It is not, however, a sufficiently rich language in the sense that there are meaningful and natural statements that one can make (about a given extensive game) whose truth cannot be decided without making the language richer. We shall give two examples. Consider first the extensive form of Figure 1.作者: interference 時間: 2025-3-29 16:45 作者: 落葉劑 時間: 2025-3-29 21:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3agents; bounded rationality; decision theory; economics; game theory; knowledge; reason作者: 榨取 時間: 2025-3-30 02:50 作者: ENDOW 時間: 2025-3-30 06:31
Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions978-1-4613-1139-3Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: indices 時間: 2025-3-30 09:32
0924-6126 Overview: 978-1-4612-8436-9978-1-4613-1139-3Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: 出沒 時間: 2025-3-30 15:52 作者: Cabinet 時間: 2025-3-30 20:32 作者: –吃 時間: 2025-3-30 21:45 作者: Digest 時間: 2025-3-31 01:39 作者: 擦試不掉 時間: 2025-3-31 05:05
Axiomatic Indefinability of Common Knowledge in Finitary LogicsIn game theory and economics, we often meet the concept of common knowledge. In literature, there are quite a few approaches to common knowledge. In this paper, we discuss the approach in the terms of epistemic logics, and consider several questions on the definability of common knowledge in such logics ...作者: Eosinophils 時間: 2025-3-31 09:47
From Logical Omniscience to Partial Logical CompetenceEpistemic or doxastic logic is often constructed on classical propositional logic to which a knowledge or belief operator . is added with the intended interpretation “I know that” or “I believe that”.作者: 剝皮 時間: 2025-3-31 16:19
Representing the Knowledge of Turing MachinesIn this paper, we shall follow the implications of the following pair of principles.作者: projectile 時間: 2025-3-31 20:22 作者: Perigee 時間: 2025-4-1 00:16
Extension Theorems,sets E. (.=0, 1, 2,…) may be empty from some . onward. The sequence of restrictions R. = R | E. will be called a . for R. We shall identify R itself with the restrictive sequence defined by E. = E(.=0,1,2,…).作者: 后退 時間: 2025-4-1 05:26 作者: dialect 時間: 2025-4-1 08:37
Dynamical Systems of Probabilistic Origin: Gaussian and Poisson Systems,
