標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Environmental Economics and the International Economy; Laura Marsiliani,Michael Rauscher,Cees Withagen Book 2002 Springer Science+Business [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Taft 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:04
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy被引頻次
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy年度引用
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy讀者反饋
書目名稱Environmental Economics and the International Economy讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: albuminuria 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:29
Die ?ffentlichkeitsarbeit der Nebenklagets budget at all times through distortionary taxes: a given income transfer has to be financed out of tariff and pollution tax revenue. We show that the switch from trade tariffs to environmental taxes can yield an increase in real income thus providing a second dividend in addition to the environmental improvement.作者: Outmoded 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:39 作者: CAMEO 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:41
,Zusammenfassung Theorie – Ausblick Empirie,Especially, the distortions due to imperfect competition may cause that the investments in abatement under taxes deviate more than under standards from what is best from the governments’ perspective. The reason is that standards act as a commitment device so that some of the distortions disappear.作者: 槍支 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:17
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19512-4re matching. Our empirical estimates suggest that “dirty” firms . responding to environmental regulations, but more importantly we find that traditional parametric methods used in previous studies may dramatically . the impact of more stringent environmental regulations.作者: 天賦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:48 作者: 天賦 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:05 作者: 爭(zhēng)吵加 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:22 作者: JIBE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:18
International Competition and Investment in Abatement: Taxes Versus Standards,Especially, the distortions due to imperfect competition may cause that the investments in abatement under taxes deviate more than under standards from what is best from the governments’ perspective. The reason is that standards act as a commitment device so that some of the distortions disappear.作者: 緩解 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:43 作者: Lament 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:35 作者: blithe 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:36 作者: Impugn 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:24 作者: CHART 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:29 作者: 星球的光亮度 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:08
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20415-0 we discuss empirical modelling approaches and provide some mainstream solutions to the problems. Finally, we present some preliminary estimates examining whether environmental regulations affect capital outflows.作者: Concrete 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:49
Andreas M?ller,Andreas H?uslein,Arno Rolfaken by increasing the sorting of heterogenous projects. Nontradability limits the pre-projcct availability of ERUs and, paradoxically, can increase the total number of ERUs generated. The Pareto ranking of tradable and nontradable ERUs depends, e.g., on the cost distribution for projects and the degree of search friction in the project market.作者: 象形文字 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:37 作者: 疾馳 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:57 作者: 彎彎曲曲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:52 作者: 四指套 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:56
North-South Trade and Pollution Migration: The Debate Revisited,e relative endowment of a pollution causing natural resource: South is relatively more resource abundant. Taking into account the commodity terms-of-trade effect of environment policy change, unlike Copeland and Taylor (1994) who ignore this, it is derived that if countries specialize completely in 作者: 金盤是高原 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:54
Regulatory Competition, Transboundary Pollution and International Trade,ated monopoly that emits pollution to reduce its cost of production. We study the impact of opening borders and of delegating environmental policies at a supra-national level. Under complete information, opening borders leads to a reallocation of the production from the large country (with a high ma作者: ADAGE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:11
Modelling Commitment in Multi-Stage Models of Location, Trade and Environment,s and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. In an earlier paper we used a simple model of imperfect competition to compare the environmental policies (in this case, emission standards) that would be set by non-cooperative governments for two differen作者: Epithelium 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:48 作者: faction 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:07 作者: 抱負(fù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:24
,The Stringency of Environmental Regulation and the ‘Porter Hypothesis’,odds with the assumption of stringent environmental regulation of both proponents and opponents of the ‘Porter Hypothesis’. A possible explanation may be provided by examining the negotiation of environmental regulation in a ‘political market’. In this market, stakeholder attempt to ensure their pre作者: 溫和女孩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:45 作者: 錯(cuò) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:33 作者: 空氣傳播 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:03 作者: Grating 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:19 作者: 四海為家的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:09
Should Emissions Reduction Units be Tradable?,hould ERUs be tradable in the international permit market or usable only to project partners? This important Kyoto detail has received little attention, although the trading rule is a key determinant of incentives to carry out abatement projects. We show that because generating ERUs on a project-by-作者: onlooker 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:39
The Kyoto Regime, Changing Patterns of International Trade and Carbon Leakage,to Protocol. Energy- en carbon-intensive industries in these countries fear that policies to implements these reduction targets will harm their competitiveness, endanger employment and will not improve the global environment, because of carbon leakage. Various studies have analyzed competitiveness a作者: BUMP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:09
Economy & Environmenthttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/312617.jpg作者: Peak-Bone-Mass 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:40
978-90-481-6112-6Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002作者: 小隔間 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:05
Environmental Economics and the International Economy978-0-306-48021-8Series ISSN 0924-1019 作者: 舊石器時(shí)代 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:29
Die ?ffentlichkeitsarbeit der Nebenklagee-good two-factor small open economy. We allow for non-tradables and for market power in the export market. The government is constrained to balance its budget at all times through distortionary taxes: a given income transfer has to be financed out of tariff and pollution tax revenue. We show that t作者: 現(xiàn)存 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:39
Entwicklung und Aufgaben des Dritten Sektorse relative endowment of a pollution causing natural resource: South is relatively more resource abundant. Taking into account the commodity terms-of-trade effect of environment policy change, unlike Copeland and Taylor (1994) who ignore this, it is derived that if countries specialize completely in 作者: 陰險(xiǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:23 作者: intellect 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:22
,Empirie — Schriftliche Befragung,s and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. In an earlier paper we used a simple model of imperfect competition to compare the environmental policies (in this case, emission standards) that would be set by non-cooperative governments for two differen作者: exacerbate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:44
,Zusammenfassung Theorie – Ausblick Empirie,ernational markets and transboundary pollution, this may not be true. In those circumstances, taxes may give rise to more distortions than standards. Especially, the distortions due to imperfect competition may cause that the investments in abatement under taxes deviate more than under standards fro作者: emission 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:31 作者: 食物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:22
?ffentlichrechtliche Stellung des Arztesodds with the assumption of stringent environmental regulation of both proponents and opponents of the ‘Porter Hypothesis’. A possible explanation may be provided by examining the negotiation of environmental regulation in a ‘political market’. In this market, stakeholder attempt to ensure their pre作者: etiquette 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-19512-4ique county-level data set for New York State from 1980–1990, and a new empirical model: a semi-nonparametric empirical method based on propensity score matching. Our empirical estimates suggest that “dirty” firms . responding to environmental regulations, but more importantly we find that tradition作者: 擁護(hù)者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:15 作者: 有抱負(fù)者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:57 作者: Flatter 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:46 作者: GREEN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:34
Andreas M?ller,Andreas H?uslein,Arno Rolfhould ERUs be tradable in the international permit market or usable only to project partners? This important Kyoto detail has received little attention, although the trading rule is a key determinant of incentives to carry out abatement projects. We show that because generating ERUs on a project-by-作者: 鎮(zhèn)壓 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56945-6to Protocol. Energy- en carbon-intensive industries in these countries fear that policies to implements these reduction targets will harm their competitiveness, endanger employment and will not improve the global environment, because of carbon leakage. Various studies have analyzed competitiveness a作者: paltry 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:36
https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-48021-2Carbon Leakage; environment; environmental economics; environmental policy; income distribution; internat作者: 正面 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:42
Environmental Economics and the International Economy
