標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 15th International C Arunesh Sinha,Jie Fu,Tao Zhang Conference proceedings 2025 The Editor(s) (if ap [打印本頁] 作者: CT951 時間: 2025-3-21 19:09
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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
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書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Synthesize 時間: 2025-3-21 20:36
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74835-6cyber security; cyber defense; data security and privacy; artificial intelligence; cyber economics; cyber作者: 媒介 時間: 2025-3-22 02:37 作者: Graves’-disease 時間: 2025-3-22 08:24 作者: Infect 時間: 2025-3-22 11:21
Fuzzy MOMSDM for Dynamic Machine Allocation,ng methods are time-consuming, resource-intensive, and prone to human errors. Current trends?in automated penetration testing are also impractical, facing significant challenges such as the curse of dimensionality, scalability issues, and lack of adaptability to network changes.?To address these iss作者: Pedagogy 時間: 2025-3-22 15:05
ns built into a model can?have substantial financial or even national security impacts. Computer scientists are often asked to optimize for worst-case outcomes,?and since security is largely focused on risk mitigation, preparing?for the worst-case scenario appears rational. In this work,?we demonstr作者: Pedagogy 時間: 2025-3-22 17:21 作者: 希望 時間: 2025-3-23 00:49
Fuzzy-Chips und Hardwaresysteme, which relies on proof-of-work mining to secure the underlying blockchain protocol. Miners empowered by quantum computers will have superior computational power to win the competition. The quantum advantage jeopardizes?the security and trustworthy of cryptocurrency and the transaction validation pr作者: 肉身 時間: 2025-3-23 02:24 作者: 大酒杯 時間: 2025-3-23 06:58
The Search for Human Intelligence goods in selected areas. We?model this as a large two-player zero-sum one-shot game played on a?graph representation of the physical world, with the optimal logistics plans described by the (possibly randomized) Nash equilibria of?this game. Our logistics model is fairly sophisticated, and is able?作者: medium 時間: 2025-3-23 12:53
,Stabilit?tsanalyse von Fuzzy-Reglern,tional cyber defense mechanisms fail to pose dynamic measures to stop ransomware attacks from progressing through various stages in the attack process. To this end, intelligent cyber deception strategies can be effective when they leverage information about attacker strategies and deploy deceptive a作者: brother 時間: 2025-3-23 16:12 作者: mastopexy 時間: 2025-3-23 21:05
Die Elemente der Fuzzy - Theorie,n accounting for spillovers?of risks from other firms with whom they have risk interdependencies. We extend these models by proposing ., in which agents have . of network effects: an agent in a .-hop network game accounts for not?only its immediate neighbors (those with whom it directly has?joint op作者: 密碼 時間: 2025-3-24 00:09 作者: GILD 時間: 2025-3-24 05:46 作者: encomiast 時間: 2025-3-24 08:42 作者: 挫敗 時間: 2025-3-24 10:40
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciencehttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/284487.jpg作者: 不愛防注射 時間: 2025-3-24 17:02
0302-9743 which took place in New York City, USA, in October 2024.?..The 15 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 27 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: systems security; economics; equilibrium and control; cyber deception; network and privac作者: Adherent 時間: 2025-3-24 19:33
Grundlagen unscharfer Entscheidungsmodelle,eviously studied and that its runtimes even outperform the best incomplete algorithms. We expect our algorithm to be applicable to important game models in economics, political science, security, and?many other fields.作者: 過分 時間: 2025-3-25 01:09 作者: Neutropenia 時間: 2025-3-25 05:02
Conference proceedings 2025hey were organized in topical sections as follows: systems security; economics; equilibrium and control; cyber deception; network and privacy; adversarial machine learning; and cyber-physical systems..作者: guardianship 時間: 2025-3-25 11:34 作者: 收藏品 時間: 2025-3-25 15:09 作者: 浮雕寶石 時間: 2025-3-25 19:26 作者: A保存的 時間: 2025-3-25 23:11 作者: Ostrich 時間: 2025-3-26 00:41
Fuzzy-Chips und Hardwaresystemetiple victims. We also study convergence towards equilibria from mutual experience collected by victims and the attacker?and compare the equilibrium limits of the model with recommendations from real-life reported experience.作者: agonist 時間: 2025-3-26 05:31 作者: mediocrity 時間: 2025-3-26 10:11
The Price of?Pessimism for?Automated Defenseoners. By considering different models of attacker knowledge about the state of the?game and a defender’s hidden information, we find that there is a cost?to the defender for optimizing against the worst case.作者: Ige326 時間: 2025-3-26 16:17 作者: 細(xì)頸瓶 時間: 2025-3-26 17:10 作者: Infect 時間: 2025-3-27 00:28 作者: dragon 時間: 2025-3-27 03:17 作者: MARS 時間: 2025-3-27 08:36
On Countering Ransomware Attacks Using Strategic Deceptioneypots, honeyfiles, and network honeypots in subgames. Using closed-form backward induction, we evaluated Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). We perform a numerical analysis using real-world data and statistics pertaining to the impact of ransomware attacks in the healthcare sector. Our healthc作者: 星星 時間: 2025-3-27 12:54 作者: Largess 時間: 2025-3-27 15:48
Extended Horizons: Multi-hop Awareness in?Network Gamessk spillovers, emphasizing the dependency of agents’ efforts on the nature of?their dependencies (complement vs. substitute nature of efforts), agents’ different levels . of awareness of the network effects, and?the reactive vs. passive nature of lower awareness (lower .) agents?to those with higher作者: 是限制 時間: 2025-3-27 18:01
in?Graphs: Resource Takeover Games in?Graphs dynamical systems, along with the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) takeover strategies. Second, for scalar linear discrete-time dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state of the system. Additionally, fo作者: RENAL 時間: 2025-3-28 01:11
Effective Anonymous Messaging: The?Role of?Altruismize the emerging equilibria, quantify?the impact of different types and levels of altruism, and assess?the efficiency of potential outcomes versus socially optimal allocations. Moreover, taking a mechanism design approach, we?show how the betweenness centrality (BC) measure can be utilized?to achiev作者: 猛烈責(zé)罵 時間: 2025-3-28 05:16
Towards a?Game-Theoretic Understanding of?Explanation-Based Membership Inference Attacks explanation variance and compute an optimal threshold for membership determination. We propose a sound mathematical formulation to?prove that such an optimal threshold exists, which can be used to launch MIA and identify conditions for a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in this dynamic system. Fin作者: Genteel 時間: 2025-3-28 08:17 作者: DUST 時間: 2025-3-28 10:42
Fuzzy-Chips und Hardwaresystemeions of having one or multiple quantum miners to?the security of the Bitcoin network? We conduct a novel game theoretic and economic analysis to address these questions. Simulation illustrates that quantum miners would have to collude to gain?from double spending in a quantum competitive environment作者: RADE 時間: 2025-3-28 15:47
The Search for Human Intelligence?to reasonably large games. We also demonstrate the importance?of explicitly modeling the capabilities of the adversary via ablation studies and comparisons with a naive logistics plan based?on heuristics.作者: Prostatism 時間: 2025-3-28 19:01 作者: 不理會 時間: 2025-3-29 02:13
Grundlagen der Theorie der Fuzzy-Mengen,ive?and reference policies. Thanks to decentralization, this algorithm scales linearly with the number of agents and also facilitates?the efficient synthesis of reference policies. We then explore a?more general version of the deceptive policy synthesis problem.?In particular, we consider a supervis作者: INCH 時間: 2025-3-29 06:34
Die Elemente der Fuzzy - Theorie,sk spillovers, emphasizing the dependency of agents’ efforts on the nature of?their dependencies (complement vs. substitute nature of efforts), agents’ different levels . of awareness of the network effects, and?the reactive vs. passive nature of lower awareness (lower .) agents?to those with higher作者: 荒唐 時間: 2025-3-29 09:31 作者: Chauvinistic 時間: 2025-3-29 12:30 作者: nuclear-tests 時間: 2025-3-29 16:15
,Bau und Funktion des Fu?es und Beines, explanation variance and compute an optimal threshold for membership determination. We propose a sound mathematical formulation to?prove that such an optimal threshold exists, which can be used to launch MIA and identify conditions for a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in this dynamic system. Fin作者: 淡紫色花 時間: 2025-3-29 20:37
Intrusion Tolerance as?a?Two-Level Gamels replication control. For?both games, we prove the existence of equilibria and show that the?best responses have a threshold structure, which enables efficient computation of strategies. State-of-the-art intrusion-tolerant systems can be understood as instantiations of our game?with heuristic cont作者: 易怒 時間: 2025-3-30 01:21
MEGA-PT: A Meta-game Framework for?Agile Penetration Testingng methods are time-consuming, resource-intensive, and prone to human errors. Current trends?in automated penetration testing are also impractical, facing significant challenges such as the curse of dimensionality, scalability issues, and lack of adaptability to network changes.?To address these iss作者: Gourmet 時間: 2025-3-30 05:48
The Price of?Pessimism for?Automated Defensens built into a model can?have substantial financial or even national security impacts. Computer scientists are often asked to optimize for worst-case outcomes,?and since security is largely focused on risk mitigation, preparing?for the worst-case scenario appears rational. In this work,?we demonstr作者: 一美元 時間: 2025-3-30 09:50
Ransom Roulette: Learning the?Games Behind Cyber Extortionr?to unlock files after paying the ransom to prevent data loss. Simultaneously, the attacker can strategically decide whether or?not to unlock the files after receiving payment. This can be modelled?as a strategic game, repeated over time. In addition, the attacker?may change their mind at any point作者: APNEA 時間: 2025-3-30 14:46 作者: 開玩笑 時間: 2025-3-30 20:01 作者: 痛恨 時間: 2025-3-30 23:02
Contested Logistics: A Game-Theoretic Approach goods in selected areas. We?model this as a large two-player zero-sum one-shot game played on a?graph representation of the physical world, with the optimal logistics plans described by the (possibly randomized) Nash equilibria of?this game. Our logistics model is fairly sophisticated, and is able?
