標題: Titlebook: Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications; Alain Haurie,Georges Zaccour Book 2005 Springer-Verlag US 2005 economics.game theory.management.mo [打印本頁] 作者: Ingrown-Toenail 時間: 2025-3-21 19:46
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications被引頻次
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications年度引用
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications讀者反饋
書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications讀者反饋學科排名
作者: deforestation 時間: 2025-3-21 22:29 作者: 純樸 時間: 2025-3-22 02:41
https://doi.org/10.1007/b105876economics; game theory; management; modeling; paraplusig; science作者: Morose 時間: 2025-3-22 07:03 作者: OATH 時間: 2025-3-22 11:54
Wege zum Softwarebau von morgen,This note considers production (or market) games with transferable utility. It brings out that, in many cases, explicit core solutions may be defined by shadow prices — and reached via quite natural dynamics.作者: lacrimal-gland 時間: 2025-3-22 13:52
Production Games and Price Dynamics,This note considers production (or market) games with transferable utility. It brings out that, in many cases, explicit core solutions may be defined by shadow prices — and reached via quite natural dynamics.作者: lacrimal-gland 時間: 2025-3-22 17:13
Leistungsabgabe und Energielieferung,oalitions of these players and multilinear connectionist Operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. Static and dynamical cooperative games also involve coalitions. Allowing “coalitions to evolve” requires the embedding of the finite set of coalitions in the compact convex subset of “f作者: 深淵 時間: 2025-3-22 23:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72871-9eitmann (1967), for open-loop dynamic games in Dockner and Leitmann (2001) were given. In these papers each player has its own state which it controls with its own control inputs. That is, there is a state equation for each player. However, many applications involve the players competing for a singl作者: airborne 時間: 2025-3-23 01:40
Wege zum Softwarebau von morgen, way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the paths so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of non-cooperative game theory an作者: SLING 時間: 2025-3-23 08:02 作者: 甜食 時間: 2025-3-23 10:19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4ciple and based on it solution concepts are introduced. The new concept of “imputation distribution procedure” is defined connected with the basic definitions of time-consistency and strongly time-consistency. Sufficient conditions of the existence of time-consistent solutions are derived. For a lar作者: neoplasm 時間: 2025-3-23 14:49 作者: 龍蝦 時間: 2025-3-23 19:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 is to derive and compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, and then examine the robustness of the literature‘s results, especially those of Qiu (1997). We find that The main results of this study are as follows: (a) Bertrand competition is more efficient if R&D productivity is low, industry spillove作者: Macronutrients 時間: 2025-3-24 00:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator‘s decisions, albeit at a cost. The proportion of Believers and Non-Believers changes over time depending on the relative profits of both groups. We show that the Regulator can use mis作者: Ointment 時間: 2025-3-24 03:28
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4ls of climate change policies. We exploit the well recognized fact that the climate and economic Subsystems evolve at very different time scales. We formulate the international negotiation at the level of climate control as a piecewise deterministic stochastic game played in the “slow” time scale, w作者: chassis 時間: 2025-3-24 10:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 and may also introduce a private label at a lower price than the manufacturer‘s brand. The aim of this paper is twofold. We first assess in a dynamic context the impact of a private label introduction on the players‘ payoffs. If this is beneficial for the retailer to propose his brand to consumers 作者: 誹謗 時間: 2025-3-24 12:23 作者: 使服水土 時間: 2025-3-24 18:50
Podcasts als Kommunikationsinstrumentn of the solution policy to a later starting time and any possible state brought about by prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal. Hence no players will have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. Recently a general mechanism for the derivation of payoff distribution procedur作者: Critical 時間: 2025-3-24 21:48 作者: 娘娘腔 時間: 2025-3-25 00:12 作者: conspicuous 時間: 2025-3-25 05:48 作者: 心胸開闊 時間: 2025-3-25 09:41
Leistungsabgabe und Energielieferung,the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist Operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through作者: 心胸開闊 時間: 2025-3-25 13:26
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4lts in higher R&D Investments compared to Bertrand‘s. These results show that the relative efficiencies of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are sensitive to the suggested specifications, and hence far from being robust.作者: landfill 時間: 2025-3-25 19:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4be represented in the slow time scale whereas the economic adjustments are represented in the fast time scale as solutions of general economic equilibrium models. We provide some indications on the integration of different classes of models that could be made, using an hierarchical game theoretic structure.作者: Morose 時間: 2025-3-25 21:31
Olaf G?ttgens,Sven D?rrenb?cheryed over an infinite horizon, with manufacturers as leaders. Stationary feedback equilibria are computed, and numerical simulations are carried out in order to illustrate how channel members should allocate their marketing efforts.作者: 乏味 時間: 2025-3-26 03:20
Podcasts als Kommunikationsinstruments agree to form a cartel. In particular, one firm has absolute and marginal cost advantage over the other forcing one of the firms to become a dormant firm. A subgame consistent solution based on the Nash bargaining axioms is derived.作者: 禁止,切斷 時間: 2025-3-26 05:35 作者: Irritate 時間: 2025-3-26 10:56
Incentive Strategies for Shelf-Space Allocation in Duopolies,yed over an infinite horizon, with manufacturers as leaders. Stationary feedback equilibria are computed, and numerical simulations are carried out in order to illustrate how channel members should allocate their marketing efforts.作者: 鐵塔等 時間: 2025-3-26 14:15 作者: 舊式步槍 時間: 2025-3-26 18:31 作者: Permanent 時間: 2025-3-27 00:15 作者: frugal 時間: 2025-3-27 03:18 作者: prodrome 時間: 2025-3-27 07:24 作者: Arresting 時間: 2025-3-27 11:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 supplier strives to maximize its profit..We show that in both cases some Nash equilibrium exists. Nevertheless a close analysis of the equilibrium for profit maximization shows that it is not realistic. This raises the difficulty to predict the behavior of a market where the suppliers are known to be mainly interested by profit maximization.作者: Diatribe 時間: 2025-3-27 17:25 作者: 哪有黃油 時間: 2025-3-27 19:47 作者: 喃喃訴苦 時間: 2025-3-27 22:29
Cooperative Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information,ge class of games where these conditions cannot be satisfied the regularization procedure is developed and new characteristic function is constructed. The “regularized” core is defined and strongly time-consistency proved. The Special case of stochastic games is also investigated in details.作者: deceive 時間: 2025-3-28 02:37 作者: 變色龍 時間: 2025-3-28 06:46
Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game,leading tax announcements to steer the economy to an equilibrium that is Pareto superior to the solutions usually suggested in the literature. Depending upon the initial proportion of Believers, the Regulator may prefer a fast or a low speed of reaction of the firms to differences in Believers/Non-Believers profits.作者: inspiration 時間: 2025-3-28 12:25 作者: Protein 時間: 2025-3-28 16:15 作者: Immunotherapy 時間: 2025-3-28 20:38 作者: 身心疲憊 時間: 2025-3-29 02:13 作者: 非實體 時間: 2025-3-29 05:29 作者: 殺人 時間: 2025-3-29 11:15 作者: 抱負 時間: 2025-3-29 14:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 context the impact of a private label introduction on the players‘ payoffs. If this is beneficial for the retailer to propose his brand to consumers and detrimental to the manufacturer, we wish then to investigate if a cooperative advertising program could help the manufacturer to mitigate the negative impact of the private label.作者: 狂熱語言 時間: 2025-3-29 16:20
Dynamical Connectionist Network and Cooperative Games,oalitions of these players and multilinear connectionist Operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. Static and dynamical cooperative games also involve coalitions. Allowing “coalitions to evolve” requires the embedding of the finite set of coalitions in the compact convex subset of “f作者: Abnormal 時間: 2025-3-29 23:14
A Direct Method for Open-Loop Dynamic Games for Affine Control Systems,eitmann (1967), for open-loop dynamic games in Dockner and Leitmann (2001) were given. In these papers each player has its own state which it controls with its own control inputs. That is, there is a state equation for each player. However, many applications involve the players competing for a singl作者: 泥瓦匠 時間: 2025-3-30 00:24
Braess Paradox and Properties of Wardrop Equilibrium in Some Multiservice Networks, way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the paths so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of non-cooperative game theory an作者: inchoate 時間: 2025-3-30 07:37 作者: 安撫 時間: 2025-3-30 09:33 作者: detach 時間: 2025-3-30 15:04
