標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games; Theory, Solution Tec David W. K. Yeung,Leon A. Petrosyan Textbook 2022 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and [打印本頁] 作者: 轉(zhuǎn)變 時間: 2025-3-21 19:14
書目名稱Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games影響因子(影響力)
作者: Mortal 時間: 2025-3-21 23:21 作者: 刺耳的聲音 時間: 2025-3-22 04:25 作者: Lacerate 時間: 2025-3-22 06:44
Theory and Decision Library Chttp://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/283404.jpg作者: Fibroid 時間: 2025-3-22 09:59
Difficult Questions to Structurehe introduction of a novel class of strategies which has durable effects in strategic interactive analysis over time generates a new perspective to dynamic game theory. Durable strategies such as investments, advertisement, durable goods, diffusion of knowledge are prevalent in real-life situations.作者: syncope 時間: 2025-3-22 14:26
Why Decision Analysis Is the Right Solutione state dynamics. A novel dynamic optimization theorem involving durable strategies is developed as the foundation for the derivation of game equilibria. Worth noting is that both the current state variables and previously executed durable strategies appear as given in the stage optimization problem作者: syncope 時間: 2025-3-22 17:48 作者: Outshine 時間: 2025-3-23 00:56 作者: Vulnerable 時間: 2025-3-23 03:20
WCOM? Business Process Excellenceyoffs and the state dynamics. Drawing attention to non-cooperative behaviors among participants would, in general, lead to an outcome which is not Pareto optimal, cooperative solutions satisfying Pareto optimality and individual rationality are explored. To guarantee that the participants would not 作者: 糾纏 時間: 2025-3-23 05:47
Carlo Baroncelli,Noela Ballerioaximization by individual agents or nations leads to environmental degradation that would destroy the environmental conditions for the existence of humankind. Unilateral response of a single nation or region deems to be ineffective in providing a viable solution. To reflect the extent of non-coopera作者: plasma 時間: 2025-3-23 09:47 作者: Vasoconstrictor 時間: 2025-3-23 14:42
WCOM (World Class Operations Management)cial activities, the participants’ game horizons differ because of different life spans, different entry and exit times, different terms of office and the different durations of leases. The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized and an illustrative example is provided. Yeung and Petrosyan then作者: COWER 時間: 2025-3-23 18:09
Carlo Baroncelli,Noela Balleriothe reality that future events are often unavoidable, durable-strategies dynamic games are cast into a stochastic framework. A dynamic optimization theorem involving durable strategies problems with stochastic elements in the state dynamics and payoff structures is developed. The game equilibrium so作者: 鴕鳥 時間: 2025-3-24 01:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92742-4Dynamic Game Theory; Dynamic Optimization; Decision Theory; Operations Research; Computational Mathemati作者: Agility 時間: 2025-3-24 06:23
978-3-030-92744-8The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl作者: puzzle 時間: 2025-3-24 09:34
Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games978-3-030-92742-4Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: Engaging 時間: 2025-3-24 11:00 作者: 內(nèi)行 時間: 2025-3-24 16:21
Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games: Theory and Solution Techniques,e state dynamics. A novel dynamic optimization theorem involving durable strategies is developed as the foundation for the derivation of game equilibria. Worth noting is that both the current state variables and previously executed durable strategies appear as given in the stage optimization problem作者: Pudendal-Nerve 時間: 2025-3-24 19:58 作者: 瑪瑙 時間: 2025-3-25 02:06 作者: Baffle 時間: 2025-3-25 07:11
Durable-Strategies Cooperative Dynamic Games,yoffs and the state dynamics. Drawing attention to non-cooperative behaviors among participants would, in general, lead to an outcome which is not Pareto optimal, cooperative solutions satisfying Pareto optimality and individual rationality are explored. To guarantee that the participants would not 作者: SENT 時間: 2025-3-25 07:47
Eco-Degradation Management Under Durable Strategies: Efficiency Maximization and Sustainable Imputaaximization by individual agents or nations leads to environmental degradation that would destroy the environmental conditions for the existence of humankind. Unilateral response of a single nation or region deems to be ineffective in providing a viable solution. To reflect the extent of non-coopera作者: Gnrh670 時間: 2025-3-25 12:49
Random Horizon Dynamic Games with Durable Strategies,orizon. In the presence of durable strategies and random horizon, significant modification of the dynamic optimization techniques is required to accommodate these phenomena. An alternative dynamic optimization theorem is developed and a set of equations characterizing a non-cooperative game equilibr作者: Resistance 時間: 2025-3-25 19:12
Asynchronous Horizons Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games,cial activities, the participants’ game horizons differ because of different life spans, different entry and exit times, different terms of office and the different durations of leases. The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized and an illustrative example is provided. Yeung and Petrosyan then作者: arboretum 時間: 2025-3-25 23:30 作者: resistant 時間: 2025-3-26 01:48
Textbook 2022ed goods, regulatory measures, coalition agreements, diffusion of knowledge, advertisement and investments to accumulate physical capital are concrete and common examples of durable strategies. This book provides an augmentation of dynamic game theory and advances a new game paradigm with durable st作者: 紅潤 時間: 2025-3-26 05:52
Difficult Questions to Structureeal-life problems but also establishes a new theoretical framework with novel optimization theory, solution concepts, and mathematical game techniques. Yeung and Petrosyan also present meaningful extensions with random termination, asynchronous horizons, and stochastic impacts.作者: 臨時抱佛腳 時間: 2025-3-26 11:22
Why Decision Analysis Is the Right Solution have no such motion equations. To characterize the game equilibrium solution, Yeung and Petrosyan develop the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. To illustrative the computational details, an example with explicit functions is presented.作者: Ondines-curse 時間: 2025-3-26 13:07
Difficult Questions to Structured payment obligations incurred from previous debt-financed projects. It is a more realistic valuation theory of the firm compared to the conventional paradigm which is mainly calibrated by existing capital stocks.作者: 爭吵 時間: 2025-3-26 18:59
WCOM (World Class Operations Management) that environmental degradation and pollution could continue to build up even industrial pollution has completely stopped. Persistent escalating damages to the ecosystems could become a normal outcome for a long period of time.作者: Demonstrate 時間: 2025-3-26 22:47
WCOM? Business Process Excellencepon optimality principle is in effect throughout the cooperation duration. The subgame consistent imputation procedure differs from the existing paradigm in that previously executed durable strategies are considered. An illustration of cooperative public capital provision is provided.作者: Substitution 時間: 2025-3-27 02:56 作者: Incumbent 時間: 2025-3-27 08:04
WCOM (World Class Operations Management)ibution procedure under random horizon and durable strategies. A computational illustration of interactive investments with technology spillover to demonstrate the computation of the non-cooperative equilibrium in a dynamic game under random horizon with durable strategies is provided.作者: 集聚成團(tuán) 時間: 2025-3-27 09:26
WCOM (World Class Operations Management)e the imputations under cooperation to players in different game horizons. An application to the current environmental tragedy exhibits the problem of the cross-generational environmental commons. A cooperative solution satisfying Pareto optimality and individual rationality is designed.作者: 不足的東西 時間: 2025-3-27 14:54 作者: 妨礙議事 時間: 2025-3-27 19:11
Durable-Strategies Dynamic Games: Theory and Solution Techniques, have no such motion equations. To characterize the game equilibrium solution, Yeung and Petrosyan develop the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. To illustrative the computational details, an example with explicit functions is presented.作者: 很像弓] 時間: 2025-3-28 01:10 作者: 哪有黃油 時間: 2025-3-28 04:56 作者: myriad 時間: 2025-3-28 09:44
Durable-Strategies Cooperative Dynamic Games,pon optimality principle is in effect throughout the cooperation duration. The subgame consistent imputation procedure differs from the existing paradigm in that previously executed durable strategies are considered. An illustration of cooperative public capital provision is provided.作者: ACRID 時間: 2025-3-28 14:00
Eco-Degradation Management Under Durable Strategies: Efficiency Maximization and Sustainable Imputants for a successful cooperation plan. A dynamically stable payoff distribution procedure is developed to fulfil the realization of the agreed-upon payoff imputations within the cooperation duration. A computational illustration with explicit functions is also provided.作者: Entirety 時間: 2025-3-28 14:54 作者: 持久 時間: 2025-3-28 19:12
