標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Disorganized Crimes; Why Corporate Govern Bernard E. Munk Book 2013 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013 cor [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Dangle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:34
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes被引頻次
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes年度引用
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes讀者反饋
書目名稱Disorganized Crimes讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Criteria 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:38
The Apprenticeship of a Mathematicianspiratorial nature of the crime and the “cat and mouse” game between the criminals and their police adversaries after the crime has been committed. Many of us even admire the verve of the criminal perpetrators along with the cleverness of the investigators who uncover the clues and (hopefully) bring作者: IOTA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:29 作者: exigent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:37
Stability and the “Arab Spring”e lapses inherent consequences of managerial capitalism, or was this just an aberrant period of corporate excess hidden by financial exuberance? How could all the oversight systems fail at the same moment? Is this outcome endemic to absentee ownership and the separation of ownership and control? Is 作者: 協(xié)定 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:30
Stability and the “Arab Spring”l for corporate misgovernance. This is especially true when boards fail to exercise skillful discipline of management, particularly with regard to risks undertaken by corporate managers. Under these conditions, shareholder property can be placed at risk without the knowledge of shareholders. Corpora作者: 使激動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:13 作者: 使激動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:04
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137467836l journalists and management scholars was one of broad distrust. That portrait arose from revelations of outright fraud, excessive managerial compensation, a tattered agency relationship between management and the shareholders, and considerable evidence of a conspiracy of silence among major capital作者: Gnrh670 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:17 作者: Palpate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:28
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5boom–bust scenarios typically are thought to be strictly macroeconomic events. The housing bubble was a significant part – perhaps the main part – of the credit boom, while much of the focus on the credit boom indicates that the underlying monetary policies of the US were an essential precursor to t作者: Noctambulant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:19 作者: 僵硬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5e attendant slowdown in economic growth in many countries. The US disaster did not stop at the water’s edge. Interconnected global finance guaranteed that our credit market difficulties would be transmitted around the world. Buyers of securitized assets were everywhere: foreign banks and insurance c作者: STING 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:03 作者: 注視 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:29 作者: 扔掉掐死你 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:55
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5ystem. Each of the monitors – boards, capital market servicers, and government regulators from several different agencies – failed. In previous chapters, we discussed how each monitor tends to fall victim to the incentive structure under which they operate. Our shorthand for this process is .. Each 作者: FLAT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:46 作者: 漫不經(jīng)心 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:04 作者: Chameleon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5The importance of corporate governance problems (.) should be judged against the following paradigm of corporate responsibility作者: 剝削 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:55 作者: 就職 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:24
http://image.papertrans.cn/e/image/281500.jpg作者: hardheaded 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:52
Book 2013Corporate misgovernance and the failure of government regulation have led to major financial fiascos. ‘Disorganized crimes‘ are disruptive and costly. Munk links the two major eras of corporate misgovernance during the last decade to explain how these events occur and what can be done to prevent them from re-occurring.作者: Ophthalmoscope 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:15 作者: 感激小女 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:58
978-1-349-46090-8Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013作者: Myosin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:01 作者: Obstreperous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5g similarity to what was experienced in the US as a result of the collapse of the housing bubble. Sovereign debt’s analogous role to the debts of the American GSEs is both striking and not surprising. It is all about risk, implicit guarantees, the compensation achieved by performance pay systems, th作者: tooth-decay 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5of independent judgment to reach a more accommodating stance with their client. “Capture” does! We also use the qualifier “effective” to denote the actual entity to which the monitor addresses most of its effort. In the case of the board, the nominal client is the shareholder, but the effective clie作者: 事情 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 02:21
Carrots for Good Governance,eate “.” problems for their own companies. Negligent acquiescence of client financial results can confer a misleading seal of approval by the underwriter that is in turn transmitted to the public market. The ultimate chain of a financial tragedy is made up of many such links.作者: 宇宙你 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 06:32 作者: Aprope 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:23 作者: 職業(yè) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:43 作者: 同音 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5a. How could a company that have grown from rather inauspicious beginnings as a pipeline company to become one of the largest companies in America in so short a time? Prior to the exposure of its manifold failures, it was cited as the most innovative and best managed company in America? How did it collapse almost without warning?作者: CRUDE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:47
Round Up the Usual Suspects,he inevitable curse of all economic booms? Would these problems emerge again in another period of financial exuberance? The sad truth is that these problems once again emerged, as we now know.. The Credit Crisis of 2007–08 evidenced many of the same illnesses. What are the incentives that create such large episodes of corporate misgovernance?作者: 停止償付 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:21 作者: agenda 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 05:53
nd costly. Munk links the two major eras of corporate misgovernance during the last decade to explain how these events occur and what can be done to prevent them from re-occurring.978-1-349-46090-8978-1-137-33027-7作者: hangdog 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:31
Introduction: Defensive Monarchiescreasingly difficult to sustain. Congress didn’t believe it; the media didn’t believe it; and many commentators on corporate governance didn’t believe it either. The losses were just too large to be explained away as unusual occurrences of managerial excess.作者: GRIPE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:27 作者: 鈍劍 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:45 作者: 漂白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:05
The Apprenticeship of a Mathematician the criminals to justice. As long as you are not a victim, crime is entertainment. Network TV and the movies thrive on crime stories. Of course, not all great crimes have “happy endings.” Sometimes, the criminals get away with the loot. Contrary to the popular adage, crime often pays quite well.作者: Filibuster 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:43 作者: 不規(guī)則的跳動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:56 作者: Complement 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5he housing bubble.. There is no doubt that the easy credit conditions that followed from the Fed’s fear of deflation during 2001–04 were a huge stimulus to the housing market. Credit is like sunshine. Crops grow in sunshine, but so do weeds.作者: 泥瓦匠 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:10 作者: LAITY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:57 作者: abduction 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85088-5equity markets actually expanded! Why weren’t investors thoughtfully suspicious of management statements? Why didn’t they apply heavy discounts to projected forward earnings?What were they leaving out of their evaluations of corporate prospects and likely corporate behavior?作者: altruism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:34 作者: 同時(shí)發(fā)生 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:06
,Seeing One’s Friends Getting Rich Is Upsetting,kly and those who couldn’t or didn’t. It was a period of financial exuberance that became the greatest equity boom in American financial history. Many of one’s neighbors seemed to be getting rich. It was quite disturbing if one was not getting rich alongside them.作者: aerobic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 14:51
No Place to Hide,equity markets actually expanded! Why weren’t investors thoughtfully suspicious of management statements? Why didn’t they apply heavy discounts to projected forward earnings?What were they leaving out of their evaluations of corporate prospects and likely corporate behavior?作者: 慎重 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:00 作者: PHAG 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 23:35
,Who’s the Fish?,” ended, Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001. The similarities between these financial fiascos were beguiling. Each displayed a common equity price pattern of a comparatively long period of rising prices followed by a sudden and rapid disintegration作者: 詞匯表 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:24 作者: 平躺 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 06:47 作者: Extemporize 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 10:39
Connecting the Dots, as part of the agency problem that inevitably arose from the division of decision-making and ownership in the modern corporation. The cure was said to be making managers behave more like equity owners. The device to accomplish this goal was that a significant portion of total managerial compensation should be paid in common stock.作者: 變形詞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 14:33
Micro Risks and Macro Disturbances,he housing bubble.. There is no doubt that the easy credit conditions that followed from the Fed’s fear of deflation during 2001–04 were a huge stimulus to the housing market. Credit is like sunshine. Crops grow in sunshine, but so do weeds.作者: Insensate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:22
Crime and Punishment,ly to lead to a new challenge even more frightening. As the drama evolved, earlier choices made by key managers seemed totally inexplicable. In hindsight, one could easily argue that managerial actions had been “excessive,” even perhaps “deranged”.作者: Fantasy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:10
,Who’s the Fish?,il trader in the 1980s, then as a terminal owner and utility fuel supplier, and finally as an energy consultant to a Wall Street investment bank in the 1990s. Along with a number of other companies whose (common) stock had first soared and were later revealed as financial fiascos as the so-called “.作者: congenial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 02:29
Behind Every Great Fortune Is a Great Crime,spiratorial nature of the crime and the “cat and mouse” game between the criminals and their police adversaries after the crime has been committed. Many of us even admire the verve of the criminal perpetrators along with the cleverness of the investigators who uncover the clues and (hopefully) bring作者: 搏斗 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:06 作者: 百科全書 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 09:28
Round Up the Usual Suspects,e lapses inherent consequences of managerial capitalism, or was this just an aberrant period of corporate excess hidden by financial exuberance? How could all the oversight systems fail at the same moment? Is this outcome endemic to absentee ownership and the separation of ownership and control? Is 作者: 安裝 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:49
Carrots for Good Governance,l for corporate misgovernance. This is especially true when boards fail to exercise skillful discipline of management, particularly with regard to risks undertaken by corporate managers. Under these conditions, shareholder property can be placed at risk without the knowledge of shareholders. Corpora作者: Mobile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 19:05
The Conflicts of Managerial Capitalism,presented “a few bad apples at the bottom of the barrel.” If few in number, they were quite large in their impact. The “few bad apples” view became increasingly difficult to sustain. Congress didn’t believe it; the media didn’t believe it; and many commentators on corporate governance didn’t believe作者: coltish 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 22:35
Call Them Disorganized Crimes,l journalists and management scholars was one of broad distrust. That portrait arose from revelations of outright fraud, excessive managerial compensation, a tattered agency relationship between management and the shareholders, and considerable evidence of a conspiracy of silence among major capital
