標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations; A Theory of Mental C Wim Muijnck Book 2003 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2003 15th c [打印本頁] 作者: BREED 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:42
書目名稱Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations影響因子(影響力)
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書目名稱Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: creatine-kinase 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:38
A Duality in the Concept of Causality a consequence, making something happen, or making it the case that; influencing, affecting, doing something to, or making a difference to something. All very obvious, but only to those who already understand what causing is. But now try to explain what causality, or causation, is in terms that do n作者: archenemy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:37
Causal Dependenceresent chapter is just about Mackie’s theory (and not, for instance, Lewis’s), it is intended to point out what are the virtues of and the troubles with dependence-based theories in general, and in what ways, if any, they stand in need of supplementation with a mechanistic account.作者: nonsensical 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:47
Causal Connectionpre-emption do not seem to depend on a merely counterfactualist understanding of causation; nor, for that matter, do our intuitions about about noncausal dependence and collateral effects, the near-consensus that immediate action at a distance is impossible, or the assumption that cause and effect m作者: ligature 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:10 作者: 軍械庫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:59
Causation and Natural Lawructure as its circumstantially necessary condition) we have reached a point where we can address the first of the five problems of mental causation, described in the Introduction: the problem of mental anomalism. The problem was that .作者: 軍械庫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:47
The Problem of Causal Relataat-times) as well as of physical connection in and among particulars (mostly objects). On that account, . causation can be expected to be a matter of counterfactual dependence involving mental states as well as of physical connection involving a minded actor. But physical connections are indeed just作者: Factorable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:10 作者: 總 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:24
Getting Events Rightds the troubles of the Davidsonian view, and that squares with the factualist metaphysics, or states of affairs ontology, that was outlined in Part I. Such an event ontology is Kim’s. Kim (1976, 34) claims that作者: insipid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:48
Relations as Causal Relatafairs, or sets of these. Events are no exception: if my narrative account is right, these are episodes, i.e., sets of (mostly causally related) states of affairs that are individuated according to narrative significance. If so, we can say that causal relata are essentially property instances.作者: 袖章 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:42 作者: GNAT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:19
Against the Computational Theoryformal operations over abstract items that are called symbols. The symbols, as well as the operations over them, are then assumed to be physically implemented in the brain. This view, or better: cluster of views, is widespread in current analytic philosophy of mind, and it has shaped a good deal of 作者: flimsy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:29 作者: legitimate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:10
Philosophical Studies Serieshttp://image.papertrans.cn/d/image/265745.jpg作者: 不吉祥的女人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:28 作者: Militia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:20 作者: CT-angiography 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:27 作者: 模范 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:01 作者: Filibuster 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:55 作者: Bumptious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:15
A Layered WorldLet us now see in more detail how the world looks from a physicalistic point of view. By far the most popular elaboration of physicalism is the layeredworld view. Kim (1998a, 15–6) lucidly describes this view as作者: OPINE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:40 作者: 刺耳的聲音 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:27
The Concept of MindLet us assume, as is common, that a general account of what it is to have a mind must be stated in terms of intentionality and consciousness. Such an account may go like this:作者: Mutter 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:10
Pragya Tekade,Ghanshyam Prasad Dubeyamples, but masses (heaps of sand, pools of water, etc.) also seem to make good particulars. Scattered groups (such as soccer teams), processes (such as light beams or pressure waves), wave/particles (such as electrons and photons) and fields (such as magnetic or gravitational fields) may be more co作者: Mystic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:52
Xiaohan Guo,Haizhou Du,Weina Zhang a consequence, making something happen, or making it the case that; influencing, affecting, doing something to, or making a difference to something. All very obvious, but only to those who already understand what causing is. But now try to explain what causality, or causation, is in terms that do n作者: blackout 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:15 作者: synovitis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:10 作者: 歪曲道理 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:18 作者: conflate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:35
Xiong Wan,Yuxi Sun,Yanqing Wang,Meng Xiaructure as its circumstantially necessary condition) we have reached a point where we can address the first of the five problems of mental causation, described in the Introduction: the problem of mental anomalism. The problem was that .作者: 親密 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:20
Speech Emotion Recognition Using U-Netat-times) as well as of physical connection in and among particulars (mostly objects). On that account, . causation can be expected to be a matter of counterfactual dependence involving mental states as well as of physical connection involving a minded actor. But physical connections are indeed just作者: Type-1-Diabetes 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:05
Xiaohua Ke,Binglong Li,Zexian Ou,Xiaobo Wud for, ontologically speaking.. Most philosphers go along with common sense in holding that events are spatiotemporally situated items that happen, or occur.. But beyond that minimal assumption there is hardly any consensus to be found in the literature on this subject. I would like to start my disc作者: Expertise 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:11 作者: Habituate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:32 作者: BAN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:18 作者: Gossamer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56818-3formal operations over abstract items that are called symbols. The symbols, as well as the operations over them, are then assumed to be physically implemented in the brain. This view, or better: cluster of views, is widespread in current analytic philosophy of mind, and it has shaped a good deal of 作者: Metamorphosis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:07
Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations978-94-017-0121-1Series ISSN 0921-8599 Series E-ISSN 2542-8349 作者: NAV 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:03
Zhong Kang,Maoning Wang,Meijiao Duanresent chapter is just about Mackie’s theory (and not, for instance, Lewis’s), it is intended to point out what are the virtues of and the troubles with dependence-based theories in general, and in what ways, if any, they stand in need of supplementation with a mechanistic account.作者: 商店街 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:36 作者: absolve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:45
Xiong Wan,Yuxi Sun,Yanqing Wang,Meng Xiaructure as its circumstantially necessary condition) we have reached a point where we can address the first of the five problems of mental causation, described in the Introduction: the problem of mental anomalism. The problem was that .作者: Aura231 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:50 作者: 宣誓書 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:25
Data Science and Artificial Intelligencefairs, or sets of these. Events are no exception: if my narrative account is right, these are episodes, i.e., sets of (mostly causally related) states of affairs that are individuated according to narrative significance. If so, we can say that causal relata are essentially property instances.作者: AVOID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:25
Lakash Maharjan,Chantri Polpraserticacy. It can be claimed, however, that the relationality of such properties is not the real issue anyway: what threatens their causal efficacy may rather be their supervenient, higher-level character.作者: Benzodiazepines 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:28 作者: 獨(dú)輪車 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:41
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0121-115th century; concept; corpus; history of literature; issue; metaphysics; mind; natural law; ontology; philos作者: Narcissist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:58 作者: 強(qiáng)行引入 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:46
Causal Dependenceresent chapter is just about Mackie’s theory (and not, for instance, Lewis’s), it is intended to point out what are the virtues of and the troubles with dependence-based theories in general, and in what ways, if any, they stand in need of supplementation with a mechanistic account.作者: 繞著哥哥問 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:41
Unifying Dependence and Connectiono kinds of account really seem to clarify important aspects of the phenomenon, but if we want a full analysis, the two approaches should supplement each other. Kitcher’s conclusion (1989, 472) is different:作者: 卡死偷電 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 17:35
Causation and Natural Lawructure as its circumstantially necessary condition) we have reached a point where we can address the first of the five problems of mental causation, described in the Introduction: the problem of mental anomalism. The problem was that .作者: 饒舌的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 22:53 作者: 吝嗇性 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 00:29
Relations as Causal Relatafairs, or sets of these. Events are no exception: if my narrative account is right, these are episodes, i.e., sets of (mostly causally related) states of affairs that are individuated according to narrative significance. If so, we can say that causal relata are essentially property instances.作者: 失望昨天 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 04:36
Supervenient Causationicacy. It can be claimed, however, that the relationality of such properties is not the real issue anyway: what threatens their causal efficacy may rather be their supervenient, higher-level character.作者: arsenal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:14 作者: Fallibility 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 13:48
Getting Events Wrongussion of events, in the present chapter, by rejecting two event conceptions. The first one is that of events as having a spatiotemporal mereology, a bit like objects. The second, to which I will dedicate the most effort, is Davidson’s conception of events as concrete entities. In the next chapter I will outline what seems to me the correct view.作者: 令人不快 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:52
Book 2003t first think ofsomething like bending spoons by ‘psychic‘ powers. But no, we are dealing here with something much more puzzling: doing things for reasons, i. e. , what we call agency. Psychic spoon-bending would be a fairly straightforward issue. You just exert some psychic force and bend a spoon, 作者: 暖昧關(guān)系 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 21:15 作者: HAIL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 01:23
Particulars, Properties, and Relationsrequired, as we will see later on. I have to skip issues about propositions, numbers, facts, or negative and disjunctive items; I will not treat these as particulars, but apart from noting that they do not seem to occupy specific space-time regions, I have no heavy-weight arguments concerning them on offer.作者: arbovirus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:49
A Duality in the Concept of CausalityAll very obvious, but only to those who already understand what causing is. But now try to explain what causality, or causation, is in terms that do not appeal to such understanding! Anscombe (1971, 93) claims that作者: obnoxious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 13:10
Causal Connectionsal dependence and collateral effects, the near-consensus that immediate action at a distance is impossible, or the assumption that cause and effect must be ‘distinct existences.’ But what is the missing element?作者: 我不明白 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 16:12
The Problem of Causal Relatacounterfactual dependence involving mental states as well as of physical connection involving a minded actor. But physical connections are indeed just that: physical. As far as causal connections are concerned, the only relevant properties will be physical-nomic, not mental ones. I came across this passage about G?del, the mathematician:
