標題: Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 10th International C Tansu Alpcan,Yevgeniy Vorobeychik,Gy?rgy Dán Conference proceedings 2019 Spring [打印本頁] 作者: 哄笑 時間: 2025-3-21 18:48
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網絡公開度
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security網絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋
書目名稱Decision and Game Theory for Security讀者反饋學科排名
作者: Medley 時間: 2025-3-21 23:37 作者: FRET 時間: 2025-3-22 01:42
You only Lie Twice: A Multi-round Cyber Deception Game of Questionable Veracity,nce of interactions between an attacker and defender in a cyber environment. Second, we derive closed form expressions for a version of this model that capture the optimal strategies for both the attacker and defender. Third, we identify the potential behavior of an attacker at noncritical points via a Markov Decision Process (MDP) simulation.作者: 靈敏 時間: 2025-3-22 06:42
Discussion of Fairness and Implementability in Stackelberg Security Games,ion and the other with labels. We discuss the implementability of these constraints. In the case that the constraints are not implementable we present models to retrieve pure strategies in a way that they are the closest in average to the set of fairness constraints.作者: 騎師 時間: 2025-3-22 12:03
Investing in Prevention or Paying for Recovery - Attitudes to Cyber Risk,t allow us to categorize different approaches to risk taking. We show that many individuals appear relatively risk loving in that they invest in recovery rather than prevention. We find little difference in behavior between a gain and loss framing.作者: 梯田 時間: 2025-3-22 16:45 作者: 梯田 時間: 2025-3-22 20:53
0302-9743 missions.The papers focus on? ?protection of heterogeneous, large-scale and dynamic cyber-physical systems as well as managing security risks faced by critical infrastructures through rigorous and practically-relevant analytical methods..978-3-030-32429-2978-3-030-32430-8Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: Obstacle 時間: 2025-3-22 23:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1he model is a description of why the disclosure of vulnerabilities can only be an optimal policy when the cost to the hacker of searching for a Zero-Day vulnerability is small. The model is also extended to discuss Microsoft’s new “extended support” disclosure policy.作者: hypnotic 時間: 2025-3-23 03:48
0302-9743 eld in Stockholm, Sweden, in October 2019..The 21 full papers presented together with 11 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 47 submissions.The papers focus on? ?protection of heterogeneous, large-scale and dynamic cyber-physical systems as well as managing security risks faced by作者: Optic-Disk 時間: 2025-3-23 08:56
Towards a General Theory of Identifiabilityblems, those in the non-cooperatively computable class, the correctness guarantee of the malicious protocol effectively requires semi-honest parties as well. This suggests a wider utility than previously thought for semi-honest protocols.作者: 小畫像 時間: 2025-3-23 11:26 作者: 廢墟 時間: 2025-3-23 17:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1ion and the other with labels. We discuss the implementability of these constraints. In the case that the constraints are not implementable we present models to retrieve pure strategies in a way that they are the closest in average to the set of fairness constraints.作者: 正式演說 時間: 2025-3-23 19:38 作者: 配偶 時間: 2025-3-23 23:24 作者: 背信 時間: 2025-3-24 05:59
DeepFP for Finding Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Action Spaces,r structured games. We demonstrate stable convergence to Nash equilibrium on several classic games and also apply DeepFP to a large forest security domain with a novel defender best response oracle. We show that DeepFP learns strategies robust to adversarial exploitation and scales well with growing number of players’ resources.作者: 一美元 時間: 2025-3-24 07:26
,Toward a Theory of Vulnerability Disclosure Policy: A Hacker’s Game,he model is a description of why the disclosure of vulnerabilities can only be an optimal policy when the cost to the hacker of searching for a Zero-Day vulnerability is small. The model is also extended to discuss Microsoft’s new “extended support” disclosure policy.作者: Brain-Imaging 時間: 2025-3-24 13:57 作者: nerve-sparing 時間: 2025-3-24 17:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1 behave the same way, either sharing or hiding personal information. We present an empirical analysis of a relevant data set, showing that our model parameters can be fit and that the proposed model has better explanatory power than a corresponding null (linear) model of behavior.作者: 嘮叨 時間: 2025-3-24 21:13
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1sary can never achieve the targeted policy. We provide conditions on the falsified cost which can mislead the agent to learn an adversary’s favored policy. A numerical case study of water reservoir control is provided to show the potential hazards of RL in learning-based control systems and corroborate the results.作者: 服從 時間: 2025-3-25 01:14 作者: AMITY 時間: 2025-3-25 04:54 作者: 密切關系 時間: 2025-3-25 08:06 作者: BRINK 時間: 2025-3-25 15:09
Deceptive Reinforcement Learning Under Adversarial Manipulations on Cost Signals,sary can never achieve the targeted policy. We provide conditions on the falsified cost which can mislead the agent to learn an adversary’s favored policy. A numerical case study of water reservoir control is provided to show the potential hazards of RL in learning-based control systems and corroborate the results.作者: Mucosa 時間: 2025-3-25 18:04 作者: 分開如此和諧 時間: 2025-3-25 23:02
Epistemic Terms and the Aims of Epistemologyto use in the forecast, while the adversary calculates a bias to inject in some sensors. We find an approximate equilibrium of the game and implement the defense mechanism using an ensemble of predictors, which introduces uncertainties that mitigate the attack’s impact. We evaluate our defense appro作者: Venules 時間: 2025-3-26 01:52
Vagueness and the Desiderata for Definitione different measures. Participants tended to invest preferably in the IDS, irrespective of the benefits from this investment. They were able to identify the firewall and insurance conditions in which investments were beneficial, but they did not invest optimally in these measures. The results imply 作者: Tractable 時間: 2025-3-26 07:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1tructures to: (i) contribute towards creating attack data sets for training a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) and (ii) to support post-incident forensics analysis by having recorded a collection of evidence regarding an attacker’s actions.作者: 無法解釋 時間: 2025-3-26 10:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1g scenarios. In such circumstances the secret sharing scheme facilitates a power sharing agreement in the society. We also state that non-reconstruction may be beneficial for this society and give several examples.作者: Palatial 時間: 2025-3-26 13:10 作者: Lasting 時間: 2025-3-26 17:24 作者: Euphonious 時間: 2025-3-26 21:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1result of this process gives the insurer an estimated risk on the insured, which then determines the contract terms. The post-screening mechanism involves at least two contract periods whereby the second-period premium is increased if a loss event occurs during the first period..Prior work shows tha作者: machination 時間: 2025-3-27 04:29 作者: 救護車 時間: 2025-3-27 06:30 作者: 強制性 時間: 2025-3-27 09:51 作者: 跳動 時間: 2025-3-27 14:28
Choosing Protection: User Investments in Security Measures for Cyber Risk Management,e different measures. Participants tended to invest preferably in the IDS, irrespective of the benefits from this investment. They were able to identify the firewall and insurance conditions in which investments were beneficial, but they did not invest optimally in these measures. The results imply 作者: consolidate 時間: 2025-3-27 20:22 作者: Conflagration 時間: 2025-3-28 01:56
Realistic versus Rational Secret Sharing,g scenarios. In such circumstances the secret sharing scheme facilitates a power sharing agreement in the society. We also state that non-reconstruction may be beneficial for this society and give several examples.作者: 傲慢物 時間: 2025-3-28 05:32
Solving Cyber Alert Allocation Markov Games with Deep Reinforcement Learning,between sub-games. Due to the large sizes of the action and state spaces, we present a technique that uses deep neural networks in conjunction with Q-learning to derive near-optimal Nash strategies for both attacker and defender. We assess the effectiveness of these policies by comparing them to opt作者: 樂器演奏者 時間: 2025-3-28 07:05
Adaptive Honeypot Engagement Through Reinforcement Learning of Semi-Markov Decision Processes,ion. Meanwhile, the penetration probability is kept at a low level. The results show that the expected utility is robust against attackers of a large range of persistence and intelligence. Finally, we apply reinforcement learning to the SMDP to solve the .. Under a prudent choice of the learning rat作者: jabber 時間: 2025-3-28 13:27 作者: 過分 時間: 2025-3-28 16:31 作者: ingrate 時間: 2025-3-28 22:48 作者: infinite 時間: 2025-3-29 00:34 作者: 無能的人 時間: 2025-3-29 05:37
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8game theory and security; adversarial learning; cyber physical systems; security risk management; crypto作者: Rotator-Cuff 時間: 2025-3-29 09:33
978-3-030-32429-2Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019作者: Anticlimax 時間: 2025-3-29 14:52
Epistemic Terms and the Aims of Epistemologyn increasing demand for precise forecasts motivates the design of complex models that use information from different sources, such as smart appliances. However, untrusted sources can introduce vulnerabilities in the system. For example, an adversary may compromise the sensor measurements to induce e作者: nuclear-tests 時間: 2025-3-29 15:38 作者: 配置 時間: 2025-3-29 23:28 作者: 親屬 時間: 2025-3-30 01:58 作者: Gratulate 時間: 2025-3-30 04:05
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1ethods that has been used to model cyber deception. In this work, we first introduce a simple game theoretic model of deception that captures the essence of interactions between an attacker and defender in a cyber environment. Second, we derive closed form expressions for a version of this model tha作者: micronized 時間: 2025-3-30 11:42 作者: compose 時間: 2025-3-30 15:47
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1at the moment of implementing police patrolling. We present two ways of modelling fairness constraints, one with a detailed description of the population and the other with labels. We discuss the implementability of these constraints. In the case that the constraints are not implementable we present作者: 音樂學者 時間: 2025-3-30 17:59 作者: 復習 時間: 2025-3-30 20:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1m any attack. We introduce a new game called the prevention and recovery game to study this trade-off. We report results from the experimental lab that allow us to categorize different approaches to risk taking. We show that many individuals appear relatively risk loving in that they invest in recov作者: Conclave 時間: 2025-3-31 03:01 作者: 愚蠢人 時間: 2025-3-31 08:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1e.g., servers, routers) that monitor and flag suspicious and/or abnormal activities. When a possible malicious activity is detected, one or more cyber-alerts are generated with varying levels of significance (e.g., high, medium, or low). Some subset of these alerts may then be assigned to cyber-secu作者: 打火石 時間: 2025-3-31 10:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1 incur an information cost but reap the benefits of a more extensive social interaction. Freeloaders benefit from the same social interaction but do not share personal information. The resulting public goods structure is analyzed both theoretically and empirically. In particular, we show that the pr作者: Resistance 時間: 2025-3-31 13:43 作者: 排名真古怪 時間: 2025-3-31 18:14
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1to understand the vulnerabilities of RL. Focusing on .-learning, we show that .-learning algorithms converge under stealthy attacks and bounded falsifications on cost signals. We characterize the relation between the falsified cost and the .-factors as well as the policy learned by the learning agen作者: Condyle 時間: 2025-4-1 00:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-0471-1 potential attackers. We present DeepFP, an approximate extension of fictitious play in continuous action spaces. DeepFP represents players’ approximate best responses via generative neural networks which are highly expressive implicit density approximators. It additionally uses a game-model network作者: 燦爛 時間: 2025-4-1 05:22
