標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Decision Processes in Economics; Proceedings of the V Gianni Ricci Conference proceedings 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Diffe [打印本頁] 作者: fumble 時間: 2025-3-21 17:16
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics被引頻次
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics年度引用
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics讀者反饋
書目名稱Decision Processes in Economics讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: apiary 時間: 2025-3-21 22:38 作者: FLASK 時間: 2025-3-22 02:14 作者: 矛盾 時間: 2025-3-22 05:43 作者: Acetaldehyde 時間: 2025-3-22 11:36
Robust Lyapunov Games: The Continuous-Time Case,e games are uncertain in the following sense. None of the players knows exactly the constraints facing it or its opponent. Possibly, even the opponent’s strategies are unknown. However, each player is assumed to know with certainty that the true game lies within a known, bounded class of games. Opti作者: Lament 時間: 2025-3-22 16:17
Piecewise Deterministic and Piecewise Diffusion Differential Games with Modal Uncertainties,essive random jump times the process is either fully deterministic or is represented as a diffusion process obeying an Ito equation. In the piecewise deterministic case one considers the class of . strategies: Each player uses an open-loop control which can be modified and adapted to the current sta作者: Lament 時間: 2025-3-22 20:53
Algorithmic Solutions for Extensive Games,g solution in the former case and a weak solution in the latter (the possibility that the algorithm produces no solution at all will also be considered). Such an algorithm is meant to represent a chain of deductions from the basic assumption that each player is rational and rationality is common kno作者: dyspareunia 時間: 2025-3-22 23:09
Communication Games,f the grand coalition is taken for granted. This of course is not the case in many practical situations where only partial cooperation may be sought by some of the players. In several circumstances this may be due to a lack of communication among several participants. These situations were first con作者: plasma-cells 時間: 2025-3-23 02:57
Bargaining and Optimal Investments,o take into account the risk associated to each investment. The set of admissible portofolio becomes a two dimensional set and utility function has to be modified introducing risk which, in a rational market, is directly proportional to return. When it is possible to find a line of efficient portfol作者: 技術(shù) 時間: 2025-3-23 07:41
Robust Lyapunov Games: The Continuous-Time Case,’s strategies are unknown. However, each player is assumed to know with certainty that the true game lies within a known, bounded class of games. Optimal and beneficial solutions to the uncertain Lyapunov games are derived, and their basic properties are investigated.作者: 不公開 時間: 2025-3-23 10:41 作者: 罐里有戒指 時間: 2025-3-23 16:02
David B. Zilberman,Giridhari Lal Pandit can exploit it in no other way than by facing the firm united. Unions are thus established with the aim to take advantage of information that is useless to their members if they bargain separately. .: 026, 830作者: Digitalis 時間: 2025-3-23 18:42
,Axiomatization in Hilbert’s Early Career, equilibria is that an AS shows . a player reaches the conclusion that she should not play “irrational” strategies. Moreover no condition of the sort “objective probability = subjective probability” is assumed to hold, though it may be the result of the algorithm (for this reason such solutions are sometimes called ex .).作者: manifestation 時間: 2025-3-23 23:49 作者: 踉蹌 時間: 2025-3-24 02:27 作者: Cardiac 時間: 2025-3-24 07:18
Bargaining and Optimal Investments,ming to stochastic optimal control, referring in any case to uniqueness of the decision maker. Aim of this paper is to imbed portfolio selection in a dynamic cooperative game framework and qualify the choice of an optimal portfolio as the corresponding bargaining solution.作者: coddle 時間: 2025-3-24 11:38 作者: 貧窮地活 時間: 2025-3-24 17:04 作者: Landlocked 時間: 2025-3-24 21:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-22715-9ed via the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. One then shows how the formalism of piecewise diffusion games can be used in the construction of cooperative equilibria à la Porter. An example dealing with exploitation of a renewable resource by two economic agents illustrates this theory.作者: 斗志 時間: 2025-3-25 01:23
Piecewise Deterministic and Piecewise Diffusion Differential Games with Modal Uncertainties,ed via the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. One then shows how the formalism of piecewise diffusion games can be used in the construction of cooperative equilibria à la Porter. An example dealing with exploitation of a renewable resource by two economic agents illustrates this theory.作者: 法官 時間: 2025-3-25 05:02
Conference proceedings 1991October 1989. It coincided with the annual meeting of the italian group on Game Theory; the group is formed by economists, mathematicians, engineers and social scientists. One of the targets of the Meeting, and therefore of the book, is to create an opportunity for having together papers by scientis作者: 團結(jié) 時間: 2025-3-25 07:31 作者: DOLT 時間: 2025-3-25 14:59
David B. Zilberman,A. M. Piatigorsky’s strategies are unknown. However, each player is assumed to know with certainty that the true game lies within a known, bounded class of games. Optimal and beneficial solutions to the uncertain Lyapunov games are derived, and their basic properties are investigated.作者: Limpid 時間: 2025-3-25 19:12 作者: 調(diào)色板 時間: 2025-3-25 23:39 作者: beta-cells 時間: 2025-3-26 03:00
Communication Games,ve games with coalitional structures as established by Aumann and Drèze (1974), a unique allocation rule which is both efficient and fair can be derived and shown to be essentially given by the Shapley value of a restricted game. Furthermore, it turns out that if the game is superadditive, then the 作者: 痛苦一生 時間: 2025-3-26 05:42
0075-8442 een the monetary policy maker (go- vernment) and the responding agent (private sector). Because of asymmetry in the (stochastic) information available the Nash 978-3-540-53592-8978-3-642-45686-2Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 作者: Bother 時間: 2025-3-26 11:43
Conference proceedings 1991ferential games are treated in the papers by Basar, Haurie -and Deissemberg. Basar considers a stochastic model of a conflict situation between the monetary policy maker (go- vernment) and the responding agent (private sector). Because of asymmetry in the (stochastic) information available the Nash 作者: 中和 時間: 2025-3-26 16:09 作者: 健談的人 時間: 2025-3-26 17:52 作者: Bouquet 時間: 2025-3-26 23:21
Epistemic Reasoning in Life and Literatureve games with coalitional structures as established by Aumann and Drèze (1974), a unique allocation rule which is both efficient and fair can be derived and shown to be essentially given by the Shapley value of a restricted game. Furthermore, it turns out that if the game is superadditive, then the 作者: 勾引 時間: 2025-3-27 03:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7tion, that incorporates asymmetric information between the private sector and the monetary authority. In this model, the private sector is a passive player who simply forms conditional (rational) expectations of the current inflation rate, which constitutes the surprise component of the policy maker作者: 憲法沒有 時間: 2025-3-27 07:51
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7rkers’ income share. Recently it is been studied in a noncooperative dynamic game setting by Balbucci, Candela and Ricci [1]. They found that it is not possible to eliminate the Cycle but it is possible to locate the Golden Age point in a position where the employment rate value is determined by wor作者: asthma 時間: 2025-3-27 10:00
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7always the same firm to innovate first, i.e what generates .. The analysis is carried out within a (pure) horizontal product differentiation model in an infinitely repeated game form. Firms are identical and have perfect information. Although I will deal only with the three firms case, diffusion sho作者: 盲信者 時間: 2025-3-27 16:13 作者: cataract 時間: 2025-3-27 20:36 作者: Pert敏捷 時間: 2025-3-28 01:33 作者: 放縱 時間: 2025-3-28 05:31
,Axiomatization in Hilbert’s Early Career,g solution in the former case and a weak solution in the latter (the possibility that the algorithm produces no solution at all will also be considered). Such an algorithm is meant to represent a chain of deductions from the basic assumption that each player is rational and rationality is common kno作者: canonical 時間: 2025-3-28 08:13
Epistemic Reasoning in Life and Literaturef the grand coalition is taken for granted. This of course is not the case in many practical situations where only partial cooperation may be sought by some of the players. In several circumstances this may be due to a lack of communication among several participants. These situations were first con作者: 凹槽 時間: 2025-3-28 11:44
Outstanding Contributions to Logico take into account the risk associated to each investment. The set of admissible portofolio becomes a two dimensional set and utility function has to be modified introducing risk which, in a rational market, is directly proportional to return. When it is possible to find a line of efficient portfol作者: expound 時間: 2025-3-28 18:31 作者: 模范 時間: 2025-3-28 19:05 作者: Jogging 時間: 2025-3-29 01:26
978-3-540-53592-8Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991作者: GRIPE 時間: 2025-3-29 05:13 作者: archetype 時間: 2025-3-29 10:05
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7In this paper I will analyse the concept of correlated rationalizability in normal form and in extensive form games from a Bayesian viewpoint.作者: 顛簸下上 時間: 2025-3-29 12:11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-5374-7Let us consider an n-person game in normal form. Let . = {1, 2,...,.} be the index set for the players and X . be a complete metric space ? ., ∈ ., which we call the set of the strategies for player i.作者: antidepressant 時間: 2025-3-29 17:01
David B. Zilberman: Selected EssaysSome theoretical and algorithmical studies on common properties of the power indices, with applications to Finance and Politics, are presented together with some ideas for further developments.作者: Granular 時間: 2025-3-29 20:43 作者: ARCHE 時間: 2025-3-30 02:24 作者: Chronic 時間: 2025-3-30 04:28
Introduction,This book contains a selection of the papers presented at the symposium on “Decision processes in Economics” which was held in Modena (Italy) on 9–10 October 1989.作者: Indent 時間: 2025-3-30 10:00
Correlated Rationalizability Dominated Strategies, Refinements and Uniqueness,In this paper I will analyse the concept of correlated rationalizability in normal form and in extensive form games from a Bayesian viewpoint.作者: 軌道 時間: 2025-3-30 15:11 作者: arousal 時間: 2025-3-30 18:03 作者: 冰雹 時間: 2025-3-30 23:20
Noncooperative Capacities of Simple Games,Simple games are a most succinct description of the power structure induced by the decision procedures, focusing on winning — i.e. all-powerful — coalitions.作者: Confidential 時間: 2025-3-31 00:56 作者: terazosin 時間: 2025-3-31 05:45 作者: Talkative 時間: 2025-3-31 11:57
helps us understand our own human learning abilities and disabilities, leading to the possibility of improved methods in education. While many open questions r978-1-4613-6390-3978-1-4615-3172-2Series ISSN 0893-3405 作者: thrombosis 時間: 2025-3-31 16:01
