標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations; Holger I. Meinhardt Book 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002 bifurcation.co [打印本頁] 作者: JAZZ 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:36
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations被引頻次
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations年度引用
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations讀者反饋
書目名稱Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Brocas-Area 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:07
978-3-540-43295-1Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002作者: Iatrogenic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:38 作者: esthetician 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:54
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaften. Especially, we review the usual theoretical prediction that the commons are endangered or perhaps destroyed through overuse. Since this prediction is based on the assumption that individuals involved to jointly manage a common property have not the opportunity to communicate with each other, we co作者: MILK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:47 作者: 責(zé)任 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:21 作者: 責(zé)任 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:01
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenhree different types of arguing in the bargaining process. We assume that subjects can communicate with each other and therefore they can reach agreements which can be binding or not binding. For cases in which we assume that subjects involved communicate with each other to coordinate their strategi作者: gospel 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:37 作者: urethritis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:24 作者: DEFER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:43 作者: ARK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:00 作者: DENT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:24
Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations978-3-642-56136-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 作者: locus-ceruleus 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:40 作者: hemophilia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:18
Common Pool Resources, common properties with face-to-face communication between egoists, it seems on the basis of empirical studies that Cooperation is an essential feature to exploit a natural exhaustible resource. Since the appearance of the articles of Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) an extensive theoretical literatu作者: 不可思議 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:28 作者: 去掉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:38
The Common Pool Game,longs to the core. This can also be understood that core allocation can be stabilized by pronouncing threats and counter threats. Moreover, for a nonempty core there exist incentives for cooperative behavior while exhausting the gains that are feasible through mutual Cooperation. Therefore, by worki作者: GROG 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:48
Convexity of Symmetrical TU-CPR Games,a heavy dryness that Cooperation does not break down by using jointly a ground-water basin for irrigation purpose (cf. (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 69–82)). More formally spoken, can we expect that the core remains nonempty after small perturbations? This is in general true for convex games, since it is well 作者: 蜈蚣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:12 作者: 貪婪的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:14
Concluding Remarks and Outlook on Future Research,pecially, we have shown core existence for α . and β-common-pool TU games. These core existence results have provided us with a first indication concerning the incentives for collective decision making in common pool situations. In a second step we have derived the convexity result for a large dass 作者: 煩人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:03
0075-8442 ity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.978-3-540-43295-1978-3-642-56136-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 作者: Comprise 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:22
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaften common properties with face-to-face communication between egoists, it seems on the basis of empirical studies that Cooperation is an essential feature to exploit a natural exhaustible resource. Since the appearance of the articles of Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) an extensive theoretical literatu作者: 假設(shè) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:48
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenhe underlying economical strueture affects the stock level of the resource, that is, changes in the market, produetion or cost strueture can change fundamentally the optimal exploitation policy by appropriators in the long run.作者: Incise 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:14 作者: troponins 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:57 作者: Left-Atrium 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:02
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenthe grand coalition and, in addition, stability of Cooperation despite observed shocks, would be too strong. In such a case our interpretation would be only true for a small subclass of TU-CPR games. In other words, convexity of TU-CPR games would be a seldom event; and therefore we could not explai作者: 雪上輕舟飛過 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:25
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenpecially, we have shown core existence for α . and β-common-pool TU games. These core existence results have provided us with a first indication concerning the incentives for collective decision making in common pool situations. In a second step we have derived the convexity result for a large dass 作者: 違法事實(shí) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:05
0075-8442 ision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these coo作者: painkillers 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 11:16
Chemische und tribologische Eigenschaftenons. In our investigation of a common pool environment we are interested in the feasible gains which are realizable through mutual Cooperation and to the issue whether individuals are better off through Cooperation than acting alone. The formal aspect for Coming up with an answer will be captured through cooperative game theory.作者: Cardiac-Output 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:36 作者: 蒙太奇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:22
Cooperative Game Theory,ons. In our investigation of a common pool environment we are interested in the feasible gains which are realizable through mutual Cooperation and to the issue whether individuals are better off through Cooperation than acting alone. The formal aspect for Coming up with an answer will be captured through cooperative game theory.作者: Prostatism 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:20 作者: Wernickes-area 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 02:27 作者: 揮舞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:58 作者: 銼屑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:29 作者: hematuria 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:33 作者: Dedication 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:44
Cooperative Game Theory, theory with transferable Utility. We conflne ourself in discussing cooperative game theory to the part where the cooperative Output of a coalition can be measured by a numeraire good like money and therefore can be transfered among the players via side-payments. The purpose of this chapter is not t作者: 親愛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:10
The Common Pool Game,hree different types of arguing in the bargaining process. We assume that subjects can communicate with each other and therefore they can reach agreements which can be binding or not binding. For cases in which we assume that subjects involved communicate with each other to coordinate their strategi作者: 天真 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:53
Convexity of Symmetrical TU-CPR Games, property in symmetrical TU-CPR games. As we have already mentioned whenever the core is nonempty, we know that there exists an incentive for mutual Cooperation in the grand coalition in order to realize the gains that are feasible through Cooperation. Core existence results can only explain that in作者: Evacuate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 08:09
Convexity of Asymmetrical TU-CPR Games,unction is convex. We have mentioned that convexity can be interpreted (a) as an incentive for large-scale Cooperation and (b) that the core for a convex game remains nonempty given small perturbation in the parameter space. Large-scale Cooperation and core stability are indications (a) for strong i作者: 交響樂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:35
Concluding Remarks and Outlook on Future Research,llowed for subjects to communicate with each other. We have argued that noncooperative game theory cannot provide us with a convincing explanation for observed cooperative behavior in field studies or experiments, since the branch of noncooperative game theory cannot incorporate in füll extent face-作者: Affectation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:52
An Overview of Bifurcation Theory,d in the preceding sections. We refer the reader interested in a more thorough discussion of the mathematical results of dynamical systems and bifurcation theory to the books of Wiggins (1990) and Kuznetsov (1995). A discussion intended to more economically motivated problems of dynamical systems an作者: Bridle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:19
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42553-5cloud computing; data mining; internet of things; machine learning; social networks; algorithm analysis a作者: Resistance 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 00:51 作者: 夸張 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:14
