派博傳思國際中心

標題: Titlebook: Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources; Rüdiger Pethig Conference proceedings 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelb [打印本頁]

作者: arouse    時間: 2025-3-21 16:08
書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources影響因子(影響力)學科排名




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources網(wǎng)絡公開度




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources被引頻次




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources被引頻次學科排名




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources年度引用




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources年度引用學科排名




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources讀者反饋




書目名稱Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources讀者反饋學科排名





作者: 輕浮思想    時間: 2025-3-22 00:01
X-Ray Scattering from Purely Classical MD, which views IEAs as games, shows why. As the number of countries increases, so do the differences between them. Agreement on the basis of simple rules like uniform abatement levels without side payments will then become very difficult to reach; and yet this is often the basis upon which treaties a
作者: 結合    時間: 2025-3-22 00:52
Direct Dynamics Simulations of Ir,(dimen),f a global tax on CO. emissions. A uniform CO. tax for all countries does not necessarily give a Pareto optimal outcome. The reason for this is that some or all countries may be so large that their own CO. emissions contribute non-negligiably to the greenhouse effect, and thus their own welfare..CO.
作者: Fibrin    時間: 2025-3-22 05:30

作者: 協(xié)定    時間: 2025-3-22 09:27

作者: Binge-Drinking    時間: 2025-3-22 14:27

作者: Binge-Drinking    時間: 2025-3-22 20:37

作者: heterodox    時間: 2025-3-22 21:18
Controlling Transient Chaos and Applicationsonsiderations as:.Second, key dimensions of monitoring and enforcement system design are defined for the class of problems that involve individual point sources of pollution discharge, regulated with permits that specify limits on discharges per unit time, and for which there is likely to be profit
作者: Constrain    時間: 2025-3-23 04:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6987-3 parties can only deal on the basis of observed outcomes downstream. These are not only dependent upon the actions taken by the agent upstream but also upon some stochastic influence by nature. The formal difficulties of the approach are sketched and two special distribution functions (normal and be
作者: hermetic    時間: 2025-3-23 07:06

作者: 察覺    時間: 2025-3-23 11:57

作者: 和諧    時間: 2025-3-23 15:38

作者: 事先無準備    時間: 2025-3-23 18:10

作者: 舊式步槍    時間: 2025-3-23 23:36
Microeconomic Studieshttp://image.papertrans.cn/c/image/235385.jpg
作者: 知識分子    時間: 2025-3-24 02:31
Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources978-3-642-46765-3Series ISSN 1431-6005
作者: 溫順    時間: 2025-3-24 09:06

作者: 公司    時間: 2025-3-24 13:30

作者: fringe    時間: 2025-3-24 17:26

作者: 休息    時間: 2025-3-24 22:13
X-Ray Scattering from Purely Classical MDre negotiated. Even if agreement can be reached, it may not be sustainable. As the number of countries increases, the incentive for signatories to punish non-signatories falls, and free riding becomes more irresistible.
作者: 平淡而無味    時間: 2025-3-25 00:24

作者: VOC    時間: 2025-3-25 05:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6987-3ta) are discussed with a linear payment schedule. While for the normal—distribution (LEN—model) the solution can be given explicitly the case of the beta—distribution only allows for a numerical solution.
作者: Chemotherapy    時間: 2025-3-25 08:22

作者: 夸張    時間: 2025-3-25 12:08
Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitmentmbership in teams. Finally, the social costs of allocating resources to a conflict become greater when the team size is less than half of the number of contenders, compared to the same conflict without strategic team formation.
作者: 施加    時間: 2025-3-25 18:11

作者: CEDE    時間: 2025-3-25 22:57
Emission Taxes in a Dynamic International Game of CO2 Emissions emissions affect the climate through cumulative emissions. In a dynamic game of CO. emissions, it is shown that the tax giving a Pareto optimal solution is the same for the open loop and the Markov perfect equilibrium, in spite of the fact that these two equilibria differ in the absence of a CO. tax.
作者: 織物    時間: 2025-3-26 00:52

作者: 間接    時間: 2025-3-26 04:52
Editor’s Introductionwaste products stemming from the processes of production and consumption. In the absence of exclusive property rights and markets, conflicts over competing uses are unavoidable. In the Pigouvian tradition the remedy called for is a tax—subsidy scheme to “internalise” externalities. From this perspec
作者: 殘酷的地方    時間: 2025-3-26 12:13

作者: Coronary-Spasm    時間: 2025-3-26 14:46

作者: Initial    時間: 2025-3-26 18:06

作者: sulcus    時間: 2025-3-27 00:44

作者: 從屬    時間: 2025-3-27 02:31
The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Tradeeen countries, and I show that in such a model there is a preference for the use of standards rather than taxes as policy instruments. The paper employs a simple model of two countries who are the sole producers of a commodity sold on the world market. Production uses an input which is directly rela
作者: Oration    時間: 2025-3-27 05:59

作者: NATTY    時間: 2025-3-27 11:08
Monitoring and Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws in Europe and the United Statesonsiderations as:.Second, key dimensions of monitoring and enforcement system design are defined for the class of problems that involve individual point sources of pollution discharge, regulated with permits that specify limits on discharges per unit time, and for which there is likely to be profit
作者: engrossed    時間: 2025-3-27 15:44
The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality -An Application of Principal Agent Theory parties can only deal on the basis of observed outcomes downstream. These are not only dependent upon the actions taken by the agent upstream but also upon some stochastic influence by nature. The formal difficulties of the approach are sketched and two special distribution functions (normal and be
作者: 小隔間    時間: 2025-3-27 19:17

作者: FER    時間: 2025-3-28 01:57
Illegal Pollution and Monitoring of Unknown Quality — A Signaling Game Approach —issions and a monitoring agent (controller) whose job it is to prevent such pollution. When deciding on whether to dispose of its waste legally or illegally the firm does not know for sure whether the controller is sufficiently qualified and/or motivated to detect the firm’s illegal releases of poll
作者: Commonwealth    時間: 2025-3-28 02:17
Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources
作者: Addictive    時間: 2025-3-28 06:44
Summarising Discussion and Outlookr settle conflicts. This is not only true for transfrontier or global environmental conflicts but also when pollution has purely domestic sources and impacts. Consequently, any modelling of environmental resource allocation should explicitly capture the conflicts involved. This is not to deny the ne
作者: JAUNT    時間: 2025-3-28 11:51

作者: 粗魯性質    時間: 2025-3-28 15:08
Transient Chaos in Low-Dimensional Systemss of interest. A specific form involves the assumption that the negative impact of carbon dioxide accumulation occurs abruptly at specific levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide..Part 2 pursues in depth some specific aspects of optimizing economic models for fossil fuel use given carbon dioxide accumu
作者: Adherent    時間: 2025-3-28 19:03

作者: callous    時間: 2025-3-29 01:48
Re-synchronization Phenomenon of Microgrid,or leadership game is considered to be more appropriate than the simultaneous game for the application under consideration. The paper proceeds by generalizing the inspector leadership game such that the inspectee has an extended set of strategies, and the connection with statistical decision theory
作者: 遺棄    時間: 2025-3-29 03:55

作者: 委托    時間: 2025-3-29 09:04

作者: Pert敏捷    時間: 2025-3-29 11:57
The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Tradeutput then the choice of standards by both countries is a Nash equilibrium, and Pareto dominates the choice of taxes by both countries. These results arise from the superior commitment properties of standards.
作者: Lumbar-Spine    時間: 2025-3-29 19:28





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