標題: Titlebook: Collective Decision-Making:; Social Choice and Po Norman Schofield (William Taussig Professor of Pol Book 1996 Springer Science+Business Me [打印本頁] 作者: 貶損 時間: 2025-3-21 18:19
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:被引頻次
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:年度引用
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:讀者反饋
書目名稱Collective Decision-Making:讀者反饋學科排名
作者: Debility 時間: 2025-3-21 23:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8767-9Policy; economy; monetary policy; political economy; politics; social choice theory作者: Allure 時間: 2025-3-22 02:47
978-90-481-5800-3Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1996作者: 顯示 時間: 2025-3-22 07:44 作者: Anticoagulant 時間: 2025-3-22 11:25 作者: Grievance 時間: 2025-3-22 14:56 作者: Grievance 時間: 2025-3-22 20:52
Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formationngle party captures a majority of parliamentary seats, enabling it to form a government. Post-election government formation is normally . at the parliamentary level, though it undoubtedly involves much intraparty strategic behavior.作者: 小木槌 時間: 2025-3-23 00:23 作者: 擔憂 時間: 2025-3-23 03:39 作者: 使乳化 時間: 2025-3-23 06:35
Jeffrey Groah,Blake Temple,Joel Smollerroof as much as the results themselves that I wish to highlight. By taking full advantage of the topological and algebraic structure of the economic allocation space, one obtains stronger impossibility theorems. Specifically, Arrow’s independence axiom (IIA) alone implies that there are no efficienc作者: placebo 時間: 2025-3-23 09:57 作者: Parallel 時間: 2025-3-23 15:23 作者: 責任 時間: 2025-3-23 18:11
Springer Monographs in Mathematicsofficial. The preferences of policy-oriented voters over possible representatives, therefore, will be induced both by their preferences over policy outcomes and the institutional structure of legislative decision-making. This observation is, I believe, fundamental to developing models, and to an und作者: NAIVE 時間: 2025-3-24 01:08
Advances in Management of Staghorn Calculias the core, or set of undominated alternatives. The core is considered to be a “natural” equilibrium in that it guarantees that every coalition will achieve its maximum value given the actions of every other coalition. Thus, the core’s claim to stability is unique: because it predicts outcomes that作者: 生存環(huán)境 時間: 2025-3-24 05:06 作者: excrete 時間: 2025-3-24 08:27
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2052-5re is a consensus among researchers that the . was not a single party in this period, but a coalition of different factions.. Indeed each faction in the . has its own office, its own account system, and its own councillors, as if it were a party. Ishikawa (1978, 1984) has suggested that work on Japa作者: TIGER 時間: 2025-3-24 13:00 作者: ensemble 時間: 2025-3-24 16:51
Shock Wave Reflection Phenomenangle party captures a majority of parliamentary seats, enabling it to form a government. Post-election government formation is normally . at the parliamentary level, though it undoubtedly involves much intraparty strategic behavior.作者: 側面左右 時間: 2025-3-24 20:40 作者: 品牌 時間: 2025-3-25 03:09
Collective Decision-Making:978-94-015-8767-9Series ISSN 0924-199X 作者: 招募 時間: 2025-3-25 07:22 作者: 藝術 時間: 2025-3-25 10:36 作者: paragon 時間: 2025-3-25 11:40 作者: 決定性 時間: 2025-3-25 19:35 作者: 外貌 時間: 2025-3-25 22:36 作者: Locale 時間: 2025-3-26 01:18 作者: Medicare 時間: 2025-3-26 04:49
Advances in Management of Staghorn Calculiachieve its maximum value given the actions of every other coalition. Thus, the core’s claim to stability is unique: because it predicts outcomes that are rational for every coalition, coalitions should have no incentive to deviate from the core (Ordeshook 1986).作者: liaison 時間: 2025-3-26 09:07 作者: dyspareunia 時間: 2025-3-26 13:20
Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregationtheory has developed apace. However, it was only in the late 1940’s that social choice was rediscovered (Arrow 1951; Black 1948, 1958), and only relatively recently has there been work connecting these two fields. The connection between political economy and social choice theory is the subject matter of this volume.作者: 流動性 時間: 2025-3-26 18:13
Non Binary Social Choice: A Brief Introductiones remained transitive and complete. It has long been recognized, however, that the transitivity of preferences is a strong assumption and in the theory of social choice less demanding properties are argued to be more reasonable.作者: 匯總 時間: 2025-3-27 00:38
Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Gamesachieve its maximum value given the actions of every other coalition. Thus, the core’s claim to stability is unique: because it predicts outcomes that are rational for every coalition, coalitions should have no incentive to deviate from the core (Ordeshook 1986).作者: Ejaculate 時間: 2025-3-27 02:02 作者: bypass 時間: 2025-3-27 08:29
An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains . (nobody has his or her strict preferences always respected). Arrow’s Theorem demonstrates that these axioms are inconsistent if the domain of admissible profiles of individual preference orderings is unrestricted and if there are at least three alternatives being ranked..作者: artless 時間: 2025-3-27 11:22 作者: 喚起 時間: 2025-3-27 17:28
Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japannese politics be analyzed from the viewpoint of the . as a governing coalition consisting of different factions. The size of many of the . factions (see Tables 1, 2, and 3) was in fact about the same as the size of many of the opposition parties, supporting the conceptual framework Ishikawa prescribes.作者: 錯事 時間: 2025-3-27 18:54 作者: cumulative 時間: 2025-3-27 22:29
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-44602-8 . (nobody has his or her strict preferences always respected). Arrow’s Theorem demonstrates that these axioms are inconsistent if the domain of admissible profiles of individual preference orderings is unrestricted and if there are at least three alternatives being ranked..作者: Credence 時間: 2025-3-28 03:48 作者: 微塵 時間: 2025-3-28 08:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2052-5nese politics be analyzed from the viewpoint of the . as a governing coalition consisting of different factions. The size of many of the . factions (see Tables 1, 2, and 3) was in fact about the same as the size of many of the opposition parties, supporting the conceptual framework Ishikawa prescribes.作者: GRAZE 時間: 2025-3-28 13:34
Shock Wave Reflections in Unsteady Flows,0a). and yet had, except for the defunct French Fourth Republic, the most short-lived governments (King, ., 1990). How can instability coexist with stability in this way? How can governments break up at such low cost and with so few apparent effects?作者: Ige326 時間: 2025-3-28 15:39 作者: atopic-rhinitis 時間: 2025-3-28 19:21 作者: 災禍 時間: 2025-3-29 01:18
Social Ranking of Allocations with and without Coalition Formationroof as much as the results themselves that I wish to highlight. By taking full advantage of the topological and algebraic structure of the economic allocation space, one obtains stronger impossibility theorems. Specifically, Arrow’s independence axiom (IIA) alone implies that there are no efficienc作者: Virtues 時間: 2025-3-29 05:55 作者: 考博 時間: 2025-3-29 09:36 作者: 有害處 時間: 2025-3-29 13:13
Electing Legislaturesofficial. The preferences of policy-oriented voters over possible representatives, therefore, will be induced both by their preferences over policy outcomes and the institutional structure of legislative decision-making. This observation is, I believe, fundamental to developing models, and to an und作者: 斑駁 時間: 2025-3-29 19:08 作者: single 時間: 2025-3-29 21:15
The Heart of a Politylitics. A natural framework within which to work is one where the electorate has preferences that can be described in terms of a domain ., called the policy space, representing the possible creation and distribution of public goods in the political economy. In the most general context . would be a m作者: Glycogen 時間: 2025-3-30 01:03
Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japanre is a consensus among researchers that the . was not a single party in this period, but a coalition of different factions.. Indeed each faction in the . has its own office, its own account system, and its own councillors, as if it were a party. Ishikawa (1978, 1984) has suggested that work on Japa作者: 河潭 時間: 2025-3-30 07:33
Extending a Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formationt generation (see, .., Browne 1971; Koehler 1972; Rohde 1972a, 1972b; Leiserson 1968; Dodd 1976) was inspired by Riker’s seminal statement of the minimal winning coalition hypothesis (Riker 1962; Gamson 1961).. The second generation of models has focused on policy-driven motivations. The best known 作者: 壓倒性勝利 時間: 2025-3-30 08:54 作者: 通情達理 時間: 2025-3-30 12:28
The Costs of Coalition: The Italian Anomalyd remained the same. The Christian Democratic Party (.) always held governing power. Yet almost no government managed to stay in office for more than a few years and many governments collapsed after only a few months. Italy exhibited the lowest turnover rate of any parliamentary democracy (Strom 199作者: 燈絲 時間: 2025-3-30 18:50
Jeffrey Groah,Blake Temple,Joel Smollere’s preference scheme completely nor incorporates it into the social preference relation in a perverse way. The second result relies on a non-imposition condition in addition to Arrow’s independence axiom.. Although the independence axiom is controversial, we show that its result is implied by a mil作者: sundowning 時間: 2025-3-30 22:28
