標題: Titlebook: Cognitive Economics; Bernard Walliser Book 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008 Action.Belief Revision.Belief Structure.Cognitive E [打印本頁] 作者: concord 時間: 2025-3-21 16:43
書目名稱Cognitive Economics影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Cognitive Economics影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Cognitive Economics網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Cognitive Economics網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Cognitive Economics被引頻次
書目名稱Cognitive Economics被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Cognitive Economics年度引用
書目名稱Cognitive Economics年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Cognitive Economics讀者反饋
書目名稱Cognitive Economics讀者反饋學科排名
作者: JOG 時間: 2025-3-21 21:13 作者: largesse 時間: 2025-3-22 02:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10338-9ludes the actors’ beliefs and is considered by construction as perfect and complete. In contrast, the actor only has a noisy and partial model of the system, or even a wrong model of it, since he has to deal with limited information and bounded cognitive rationality.作者: 清唱劇 時間: 2025-3-22 05:14
Wolfgang Schweiger,Monika Reisbeckogical rules followed by the modeler when he revises his theoretical models to fit new observations. These change rules capture the dynamic aspects of the actor’s cognitive rationality, especially the economy principle which states that he changes his beliefs as little as possible.作者: miscreant 時間: 2025-3-22 11:22
Werner Wirth,Wolfgang Schweigerand instrumental rationality linking opportunities and preferences. Each form of rationality is moreover bounded by cognitive constraints, both informational and computational, which are activated when he gathers and treats the relevant information.作者: 蹣跚 時間: 2025-3-22 14:26 作者: 蹣跚 時間: 2025-3-22 20:06
Dagmar C. Unz,Joanne Capstick,Gregor Erbach the players, endowed with strong cognitive abilities, simulate one another’s behavior. In practice, constrained by informational and computational limitations, the players’ actions are more likely to be coordinated according to concepts of bounded rationality equilibrium.作者: incite 時間: 2025-3-23 00:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91623-5ation and homogenization of information among the players. Besides, in order to face uncertainty and limited reasoning, the players exploit the time sequentiality of a game by jointly following more or less sophisticated learning processes.作者: Ataxia 時間: 2025-3-23 03:34 作者: 矛盾 時間: 2025-3-23 06:58 作者: 手術刀 時間: 2025-3-23 11:42 作者: enlist 時間: 2025-3-23 17:42 作者: Esophagus 時間: 2025-3-23 20:35
Introduction,stment through which that state is attained. Responding to those criticisms, two research programs have been jointly developed, introducing the mental and temporal dimensions of individual and collective entities more deliberately into economic models.作者: deadlock 時間: 2025-3-23 23:08 作者: ALB 時間: 2025-3-24 05:15 作者: deforestation 時間: 2025-3-24 07:58
Decision-making as reasoning,and instrumental rationality linking opportunities and preferences. Each form of rationality is moreover bounded by cognitive constraints, both informational and computational, which are activated when he gathers and treats the relevant information.作者: 吹牛需要藝術 時間: 2025-3-24 14:35
Dynamic action and belief revision,epresentations of his environment, it acquires an operational value and is therefore chosen strategic ally. However, condemned as he is to bounded cognitive rationality, the decision-maker is led to use heuristic learning rules to adapt his behavior to a complex environment.作者: 名次后綴 時間: 2025-3-24 17:01 作者: exercise 時間: 2025-3-24 19:00
Learning processes among players,ation and homogenization of information among the players. Besides, in order to face uncertainty and limited reasoning, the players exploit the time sequentiality of a game by jointly following more or less sophisticated learning processes.作者: 高爾夫 時間: 2025-3-25 03:07 作者: Volatile-Oils 時間: 2025-3-25 03:50
Evolution of the economic system, emergence of social phenomena within organizations or in the economy as a whole. institutions, for example, may be generated by dynamical processes of learning and evolution governed by agents endowed with specific heuristics and meeting in neighboring interactions.作者: propose 時間: 2025-3-25 08:05 作者: Halfhearted 時間: 2025-3-25 12:53
Bernard WalliserInsight in how an economist handles human cognition, by incorporating various concepts and schemes into game theory.Insight in how relevant cognition is in classical economics (e.g. financial speculat作者: MAG 時間: 2025-3-25 18:14
http://image.papertrans.cn/c/image/229027.jpg作者: 文件夾 時間: 2025-3-25 23:22 作者: 商議 時間: 2025-3-26 04:10 作者: 他日關稅重重 時間: 2025-3-26 08:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10338-9ndividual rationality and collective equilibrium. On the one hand, individual behavior appears to be too idealized, since it attributes perfectly rational behavior to an actor without making explicit the process of mental deliberation on which it is grounded. On the other hand, collective equilibriu作者: Eosinophils 時間: 2025-3-26 10:57 作者: 抑制 時間: 2025-3-26 14:40
Wolfgang Schweiger,Monika Reisbeckources. belief change ensures both the internal coherence between beliefs and message and the external appropriateness of beliefs to the represented system, since the message is generally considered as true. A fruitful analogy can be drawn between the actor’s rules of belief change and the epistemol作者: Exterior 時間: 2025-3-26 18:18 作者: 違抗 時間: 2025-3-26 22:36
Dagmar C. Unz,Joanne Capstick,Gregor Erbachtes and his own past results. His deliberation process is adapted to the dynamic context: instrumental rationality thanks to the ‘backward induction’ procedure and cognitive rationality according to the ‘forward induction’ principle. Since information is used by the decision-maker for revising his r作者: Glucocorticoids 時間: 2025-3-27 03:16 作者: TIGER 時間: 2025-3-27 07:45
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91623-5exchange of information. The receiver may be worse off after receiving a (true) piece of information from outside sources and is only guaranteed an improvement under specific circumstances. The sender may be better off keeping his private information to himself, and therefore preventing the communic作者: cloture 時間: 2025-3-27 10:49 作者: 減少 時間: 2025-3-27 16:30
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25470-3ndogenously by its institutional one. It is transformed by a process of co-evolution between its physical sphere and its psychical sphere, in which boundedly rational agents follow self-organizing mechanisms. In particular, the transmission ofinformation and the accumulation of knowledge explain the作者: crumble 時間: 2025-3-27 20:11
Introduction,ndividual rationality and collective equilibrium. On the one hand, individual behavior appears to be too idealized, since it attributes perfectly rational behavior to an actor without making explicit the process of mental deliberation on which it is grounded. On the other hand, collective equilibriu作者: Palter 時間: 2025-3-27 22:42
Structure of individual beliefs,wn characteristics. These beliefs, expressed in a linguistic form, are evaluated in terms of their internal logical consistency, but even more in terms of their external suitability to the gathered information. The actor’s view of the system is evaluated by reference to the modeler’s view, which inc作者: seduce 時間: 2025-3-28 06:07
Change of individual beliefs,ources. belief change ensures both the internal coherence between beliefs and message and the external appropriateness of beliefs to the represented system, since the message is generally considered as true. A fruitful analogy can be drawn between the actor’s rules of belief change and the epistemol作者: circuit 時間: 2025-3-28 09:12 作者: MIME 時間: 2025-3-28 13:11
Dynamic action and belief revision,tes and his own past results. His deliberation process is adapted to the dynamic context: instrumental rationality thanks to the ‘backward induction’ procedure and cognitive rationality according to the ‘forward induction’ principle. Since information is used by the decision-maker for revising his r作者: 與野獸博斗者 時間: 2025-3-28 16:23
Coordination of players through beliefs,e coordinated on some equilibrium. An equilibrium state, implicitly achieved by a ‘Nash regulator’, represents a fixed point on the loop relating the players’ crossed expectations about their respective actions. In theory, such a state is achieved constructively by an eductive process, through which作者: BROOK 時間: 2025-3-28 21:39 作者: 一美元 時間: 2025-3-29 02:24
Communication and reasoning in an economic system,nstitutions. A match is achieved between a material sphere where goods are physically transformed and exchanged and a cognitive sphere where related data are computed and communicated. In other respects, knowledge and information may themselves be treated as specific forms of goods which can respect
