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標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining; Alvin E. Roth Book 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1979 bargaining.cooperative games.evaluation.uti [打印本頁]

作者: Ferret    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:17
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作者: Archipelago    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:42

作者: 雜役    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:05
Ordinal Models of Bargaining of real numbers to itself. That is, for any real numbers x and y, m. (x) > m. (y) if and only if x > y. We will confine our attention to continuous (invertible) order preserving transformations, and for any x in R. denote (m. (x.), ...,m. (x.)) by m(x).
作者: resuscitation    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:50
Humanistic Psychology and Metapsychologys most preferable, there is a need for bargaining and negotiation over . outcome should be agreed upon. Each participant has the ability to veto any outcome different than the disagreement outcome, since unanimity is required for any other result.
作者: 朦朧    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:47

作者: 墻壁    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:12

作者: N防腐劑    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:53
Humanistic Psychology and Metapsychology represents an assumption concerning the way in which different bargaining games are related to one another, and together they essentially imply that the process of bargaining in an arbitrary game is no different from the bargaining which occurs in the game (ā,ō), or at least no different in any way which affects the final agreement.
作者: 猜忌    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:03
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4273-2 which are independent of equivalent utility representations, but which are not independent of “irrelevant” alternatives. That is, we will consider some solutions which are sensitive to changes in the set of feasible outcomes in a way which the Nash solutions are not.
作者: Control-Group    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:48
A Critical Evaluation of the Independence Properties represents an assumption concerning the way in which different bargaining games are related to one another, and together they essentially imply that the process of bargaining in an arbitrary game is no different from the bargaining which occurs in the game (ā,ō), or at least no different in any way which affects the final agreement.
作者: adumbrate    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 06:14

作者: pericardium    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:34
Humanistic Psychology as a Protest Movementn one participant but fewer than n, these coalitions cannot by themselves secure any outcome but the disagreement outcome; i.e., they cannot secure any outcome which is not available to their members acting individually. So the effect of intermediate coalitions on the bargaining process is of generally minor importance.
作者: thrombosis    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:29
The Formal Model and Axiomatic Derivationn one participant but fewer than n, these coalitions cannot by themselves secure any outcome but the disagreement outcome; i.e., they cannot secure any outcome which is not available to their members acting individually. So the effect of intermediate coalitions on the bargaining process is of generally minor importance.
作者: 輕信    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:33
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51570-5bargaining; cooperative games; evaluation; utility; value-at-risk
作者: 表皮    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:14

作者: condemn    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:46

作者: 鑲嵌細(xì)工    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:23
Probabilistic ModelsIn the previous section we derived Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem axiomatically, by specifying some of its properties. In this section, we consider some models which yield Nash’s solution from other considerations.
作者: 協(xié)定    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:12
Risk Posturecular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.
作者: 噴出    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:32

作者: 發(fā)現(xiàn)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:59
Humanistic Psychology as a Protest Movementr by the individual participants acting alone, the special case of bargaining among two participants shares many of the properties of the general case of bargaining among n participants, for n ≥ 2. That is, even when n is greater than two, so that intermediate coalitions exist which contain more tha
作者: Charitable    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:16
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1071-6cular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.
作者: PANEL    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:47
Humanistic Psychology and Metapsychologyernatives can be uniquely determined by specifying the outcome which it selects in the ‘canonical’ game (ā,ō). Each of the two independence properties represents an assumption concerning the way in which different bargaining games are related to one another, and together they essentially imply that
作者: diathermy    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:35
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1071-6e players’ utility functions.. By ordinal information, we mean information about each player’s preference ordering over riskless alternatives. If A is a set of riskless alternatives over which player i has a preference ordering, then any realvalued function u. on A such that u. (a) > u. (b) if and o
作者: Cabg318    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:33

作者: 偽善    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:48

作者: 皺痕    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:55
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systemshttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/167729.jpg
作者: 表兩個(gè)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:37

作者: 龍卷風(fēng)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:49
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1071-6cular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.
作者: JOG    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:08

作者: Narcissist    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:34

作者: Foam-Cells    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:58
0075-8442 ch are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining consid978-3-540-09540-8978-3-642-51570-5Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957
作者: CAMEO    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:18

作者: Vertebra    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:30

作者: Hiatus    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:02

作者: 斜    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:43
Risk Posturecular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.
作者: 遵循的規(guī)范    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:12
A Critical Evaluation of the Independence Propertiesernatives can be uniquely determined by specifying the outcome which it selects in the ‘canonical’ game (ā,ō). Each of the two independence properties represents an assumption concerning the way in which different bargaining games are related to one another, and together they essentially imply that
作者: 使成整體    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:22

作者: galley    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:00
Interpersonal Comparisonsformation contained in their expected utility functions. Such solutions are independent of a wider range of transformations than are solutions which depend on the cardinal properties of the players’ utilities. But whether we have been considering ordinal or cardinal solutions, we have thus far been
作者: Tinea-Capitis    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:55
“Irrelevant” Alternativestives but which, unlike the Nash solutions, are not independent of equivalent utility representations. In this section we will consider some solutions which are independent of equivalent utility representations, but which are not independent of “irrelevant” alternatives. That is, we will consider so
作者: muffler    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:28

作者: 畸形    時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:30





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