標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory; Hans J. M. Peters Book 1992 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1992 bargaining.game theory.utility the [打印本頁] 作者: 哪能仁慈 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 19:05
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書目名稱Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 藝術(shù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:18 作者: RALES 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:08 作者: GRAIN 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:40
Camila Devis-Rozental,Susanne Clarke (1950), was based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. This chapter is a further exploration into the consequences of this axiom. This exploration is based on the concept of revealed preference, in the wider context of choice functions and choice situations.作者: hypotension 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:06
Cognitive and Mindfulness Conceptualizationus for the other players. Also, one might expect the more risk averse player to envy his (less risk averse) predecessor, because that player would probably get more out of the bargaining process. It is nevertheless surprising that bargaining solutions almost generically seem to confirm this intuition.作者: 顯赫的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:48 作者: folliculitis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:36
Der Roman und seine biblische Vorlaget any doubt the Nash bargaining solution is the most well-known and popular solution concept in bargaining — in the theoretical literature as well as in applied and empirical work. What could be the reasons for this popularity? Empirical evidence for the Nash bargaining solution certainly is not ove作者: heirloom 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 23:00
Camila Devis-Rozental,Susanne Clarke (1950), was based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. This chapter is a further exploration into the consequences of this axiom. This exploration is based on the concept of revealed preference, in the wider context of choice functions and choice situations.作者: 口味 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 04:40
Camila Devis-Rozental,Lois Farquharsonly discussed nonsymmetric Nash bargaining solutions, and chapter 3 led us to conclude that, at least for the case of two players and in the presence of Pareto optimality and (feasible set) continuity, the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom implies the maximization of a strongly monotonic,作者: 顛簸地移動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:57
Cognitive and Mindfulness Conceptualizationus for the other players. Also, one might expect the more risk averse player to envy his (less risk averse) predecessor, because that player would probably get more out of the bargaining process. It is nevertheless surprising that bargaining solutions almost generically seem to confirm this intuitio作者: BOLT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:07 作者: insomnia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:04
Alexander Dufort,Emma Gregory,Tricia Wooo a bargaining game a subset of feasible outcomes rather than a unique outcome. Section 8.3 deals with probabilistic solutions, which assign to each bargaining game a probability measure on the feasible set. In section 8.4 we discuss some extensions of existing solution concepts to bargaining with p作者: 礦石 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:33 作者: Amorous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:32
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31714-4of the whole player set ., or trivial coalitions consisting of single players, may form. Such a game is described by a characteristic function assigning to each coalition . some subset of ... We call these games coalitional bargaining games in order to keep in line with the main subject of this book作者: 侵略者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 03:13
Mad Science or School-to-Prison?iliar with or not interested in these basics, which underly most of the other material in this book, may skip this chapter or the larger part of it. Only an understanding is required of the definition of a von NeumannMorgenstern utility function, which is presented in section 11.2. Everything else i作者: 口音在加重 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:04 作者: Cursory 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:33 作者: Organization 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:12 作者: 不合 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:05
978-90-481-4178-4Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1992作者: 優(yōu)雅 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:37
Theory and Decision Library Chttp://image.papertrans.cn/b/image/167722.jpg作者: Deceit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:49
0924-6126 semodels leading to bargaining solutions that also result from theaxiomatic approach. .The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for .coalitional..bargaini978-90-481-4178-4978-94-015-8022-9Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044 作者: Flinch 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:34
Preliminaries,a solution or a class of solutions by its properties. Therefore, such properties are often referred to as axioms., which is a less neutral expression. We will use both terms, . as well . In a nutshell, this is what this book is mainly about.作者: liaison 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 11:49
Der Roman und seine biblische Vorlagea solution or a class of solutions by its properties. Therefore, such properties are often referred to as axioms., which is a less neutral expression. We will use both terms, . as well . In a nutshell, this is what this book is mainly about.作者: gout109 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:49
Book 1992ring the pastfour decades. .Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. provides achapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on thosemodels leading to bargaining solutions that also result from theaxiomatic approach. .The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for .coalitional..bargaini作者: prosthesis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:07 作者: Mosaic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:20
Nash bargaining solutions,t any doubt the Nash bargaining solution is the most well-known and popular solution concept in bargaining — in the theoretical literature as well as in applied and empirical work. What could be the reasons for this popularity? Empirical evidence for the Nash bargaining solution certainly is not ove作者: HALL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:53
Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed preferences, (1950), was based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. This chapter is a further exploration into the consequences of this axiom. This exploration is based on the concept of revealed preference, in the wider context of choice functions and choice situations.作者: ADOPT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:59 作者: 披肩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:05
Risk properties,us for the other players. Also, one might expect the more risk averse player to envy his (less risk averse) predecessor, because that player would probably get more out of the bargaining process. It is nevertheless surprising that bargaining solutions almost generically seem to confirm this intuitio作者: NOT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 18:58
Bargaining with a variable number of players, hitherto the number of players in a bargaining game was assumed to be fixed. In Thomson and Lensberg (1989) axiomatic characterizations of bargaining solutions are collected where the number of players may vary. The book shows that axioms based on such a variable population of players have proved t作者: intangibility 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:53 作者: 苦澀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:34 作者: SSRIS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:52
Solutions for coalitional bargaining games,of the whole player set ., or trivial coalitions consisting of single players, may form. Such a game is described by a characteristic function assigning to each coalition . some subset of ... We call these games coalitional bargaining games in order to keep in line with the main subject of this book作者: 冒失 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:42 作者: packet 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:28 作者: Radiation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:26 作者: dysphagia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:54 作者: archetype 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:24 作者: 子女 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 07:24 作者: 慢慢流出 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:59 作者: 有權(quán)威 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:45
Alexander Dufort,Emma Gregory,Tricia Woo solutions are collected where the number of players may vary. The book shows that axioms based on such a variable population of players have proved to be powerful tools in axiomatic bargaining, leading to new characterizations of well-known solutions like the Nash, Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky, and egalitarian solutions.作者: FLORA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:16
Mad Science or School-to-Prison?nly an understanding is required of the definition of a von NeumannMorgenstern utility function, which is presented in section 11.2. Everything else in this chapter may be read upon references in other chapters.作者: 我沒有強(qiáng)迫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:51 作者: 博愛家 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:20 作者: 訓(xùn)誡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 07:14 作者: Ornament 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:34 作者: 極小 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 16:33
Nash bargaining solutions, also these are not unambiguously conclusive in favor of the Nash solution. Even, earlier experiments by Crott (1971) point in the direction of the next popular solution, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Raiffa, 1953, Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; see chapter 4).作者: Malaise 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 22:57 作者: commute 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:33
Alexander Dufort,Emma Gregory,Tricia Wooossibly nonconvex feasible sets. Certain applications and implications of axiomatic bargaining game theory for specific economic models are considered in section 8.5. Section 8.6 reviews a few (axiomatic) models where time is involved. Sections 8.7 and 8.8 very briefly discuss ordinally covariant solutions and continuity, respectively.作者: 機(jī)械 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:49 作者: 襲擊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 10:02
