標題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Third International Spyros Kontogiannis,Elias Koutsoupias,Paul G. Spir Conference proceedings 2010 Springer-Verla [打印本頁] 作者: autoantibodies 時間: 2025-3-21 17:53
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡公開度學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: 檢查 時間: 2025-3-21 23:10
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39685-8e existence of pure Nash equilibria in subgames. Specifically, we show that the existence of a . pure Nash equilibrium in every . implies the weak acyclicity of a game. In contrast, the possible existence of . pure Nash equilibria in every subgame is . for weak acyclicity.作者: 有危險 時間: 2025-3-22 04:24
A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets,this polytope. The convex cost function depends only on the initial endowments of the buyers. This formulation yields an easy simplex-like pivoting algorithm which is provably strongly polynomial for many special cases.作者: 拉開這車床 時間: 2025-3-22 06:28 作者: Tortuous 時間: 2025-3-22 09:45 作者: crumble 時間: 2025-3-22 14:45 作者: outset 時間: 2025-3-22 17:13
Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games,ble outcome and all these problems are in PLS. The different stability requirements correspond to different local search neighbourhoods. For different neighbourhood structures, our findings comprise positive results in the form of polynomial-time algorithms for finding stable outcomes, and negative (PLS-completeness) results.作者: 提煉 時間: 2025-3-23 00:11
The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements,was previously shown to be .-hard by Borgs ., while a . hardness result is given in this paper. The latter proof yields bounds on the algebraic degree of the minmax value of a three-player game that may be of independent interest.作者: 跳動 時間: 2025-3-23 05:11
Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games,erent solutions. The settings we consider include load balancing games on identical, uniformly-related, and unrelated machines, both using pure and mixed strategies, and nonatomic routing in general and some specific networks.作者: Organization 時間: 2025-3-23 07:51
A Direct Reduction from ,-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium,r games is in PPAD, and reducing a PPAD-complete problem to computing approximate Nash equilibrium for 2-player games. Our direct reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD, eliminating some of the difficulties involved in following the known indirect reduction.作者: jaundiced 時間: 2025-3-23 11:02 作者: Subjugate 時間: 2025-3-23 17:06
A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for Itn..We also introduce production into our model; our goal is to carve out as big a piece of the general production model as possible while still maintaining the property that a single (rational) convex program captures its equilibria, i.e., the convex program must optimize individually for each buyer and each firm.作者: HEAVY 時間: 2025-3-23 19:34
Monographien zum Pflanzenschutzerent solutions. The settings we consider include load balancing games on identical, uniformly-related, and unrelated machines, both using pure and mixed strategies, and nonatomic routing in general and some specific networks.作者: Ovulation 時間: 2025-3-23 22:24
Der Apotheker als Gesch?ftsmannr games is in PPAD, and reducing a PPAD-complete problem to computing approximate Nash equilibrium for 2-player games. Our direct reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD, eliminating some of the difficulties involved in following the known indirect reduction.作者: HAVOC 時間: 2025-3-24 03:45 作者: SOB 時間: 2025-3-24 06:34
,Soll man seinen Vorg?nger verklagen?,n..We also introduce production into our model; our goal is to carve out as big a piece of the general production model as possible while still maintaining the property that a single (rational) convex program captures its equilibria, i.e., the convex program must optimize individually for each buyer and each firm.作者: Adulterate 時間: 2025-3-24 12:02
Christoph Schr?der,Bertrand Penneccent progress showing that the equilibria that are found by the Lemke-Howson algorithm, as well as related homotopy methods, are PSPACE-complete to compute. Thus we show that there are no short cuts to the Lemke-Howson solutions, subject only to the hardness of PSPACE. I mention some open problems.作者: 到婚嫁年齡 時間: 2025-3-24 14:59
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-63403-5-buyer market game. Surprisingly, all the NE of this game turn out to be symmetric and the corresponding payoffs constitute a piecewise linear concave curve. We also study the correlated equilibria of this game and show that third-party mediation does not help to achieve a better payoff than NE payoffs.作者: 樂意 時間: 2025-3-24 20:41
Der Apotheker als Gesch?ftsmannbove, fictitious play may require an exponential number of rounds (in the size of the representation of the game) before . equilibrium action is eventually played. In particular, we show the above statement for symmetric constant-sum win-lose-tie games.作者: 山間窄路 時間: 2025-3-25 01:13
Der Apotheker als Gesch?ftsmannf homogeneous and heterogeneous users differ sharply as far as the existence of strongly-optimal taxes is concerned: there are parallel-link games with linear latencies and heterogeneous users that do not admit strongly-optimal taxes.作者: thalamus 時間: 2025-3-25 07:16 作者: PLE 時間: 2025-3-25 08:48
How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?,cent progress showing that the equilibria that are found by the Lemke-Howson algorithm, as well as related homotopy methods, are PSPACE-complete to compute. Thus we show that there are no short cuts to the Lemke-Howson solutions, subject only to the hardness of PSPACE. I mention some open problems.作者: 假設 時間: 2025-3-25 12:20
Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market,-buyer market game. Surprisingly, all the NE of this game turn out to be symmetric and the corresponding payoffs constitute a piecewise linear concave curve. We also study the correlated equilibria of this game and show that third-party mediation does not help to achieve a better payoff than NE payoffs.作者: ARK 時間: 2025-3-25 19:15 作者: nascent 時間: 2025-3-25 21:10
On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users,f homogeneous and heterogeneous users differ sharply as far as the existence of strongly-optimal taxes is concerned: there are parallel-link games with linear latencies and heterogeneous users that do not admit strongly-optimal taxes.作者: conference 時間: 2025-3-26 03:41 作者: Delude 時間: 2025-3-26 07:01
How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?,s necessarily rather weak, in the sense that PPAD is only know to lie “between P and NP”, and there is not a strong prospect of showing it to be as hard as NP. Of course, the problem of finding an equilibrium that has certain sought-after properties should be at least as hard as finding an unrestric作者: oncologist 時間: 2025-3-26 10:36 作者: Unsaturated-Fat 時間: 2025-3-26 14:03 作者: 我悲傷 時間: 2025-3-26 18:40 作者: 柱廊 時間: 2025-3-27 01:01 作者: Camouflage 時間: 2025-3-27 03:30
Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games,tions to these games. For some settings, we show that the solutions are necessarily Pareto optimal. When this is not the case, we provide a measure to . the distance of the solution from Pareto efficiency. Using this measure, we provide upper and lower bounds on the “Pareto inefficiency” of the diff作者: RENAL 時間: 2025-3-27 09:21
On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games,quilibria that are far apart, or .-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. Motivated by this consideration, in this paper we define the notion of games that are ., meaning that all .-approxim作者: inflate 時間: 2025-3-27 12:28
Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games,ory research agenda. Even though the generalization of such games in directed networks is well understood in terms of the price of stability (it is exactly .., the .-th harmonic number, for games with . players), far less is known for network design games in undirected networks. The upper bound carr作者: Amnesty 時間: 2025-3-27 15:28
On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play, strategy that is given by the empirical frequencies of actions played in previous rounds. There is a close relationship between fictitious play and the Nash equilibria of a game: if the empirical frequencies of fictitious play converge to a strategy profile, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibr作者: Afflict 時間: 2025-3-27 19:43
On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria,in many naturally arising games, and thus results on the convergence or non-convergence properties of such dynamics may inform our understanding of the applicability of Nash equilibria as a plausible solution concept in some settings. A second reason for asking this question is in the hope of being 作者: 不在灌木叢中 時間: 2025-3-28 01:45
On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games, game is one where natural distributed dynamics, such as better-response dynamics, cannot enter .. We establish a novel link between such games and the existence of pure Nash equilibria in subgames. Specifically, we show that the existence of a . pure Nash equilibrium in every . implies the weak acy作者: mortgage 時間: 2025-3-28 04:21 作者: Alienated 時間: 2025-3-28 09:18 作者: fallible 時間: 2025-3-28 12:07
On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users, the selfish users by introducing taxes on the network edges. A tax vector is . if all (at least one of) the equilibria in the resulting game minimize(s) the total latency. The issue of designing optimal tax vectors for selfish routing games has been studied extensively in the literature. We study f作者: aviator 時間: 2025-3-28 16:03 作者: MUT 時間: 2025-3-28 21:06 作者: 遣返回國 時間: 2025-3-29 00:56
The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements, equilibrium of a given three-player game in strategic form with integer payoffs is trembling hand perfect. Analogous results are shown for a number of other solution concepts, including proper equilibrium, (the strategy part of) sequential equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium and CURB..The proofs作者: Talkative 時間: 2025-3-29 05:26
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting, model, a potential manipulator . announces how he intends to vote, and some of the other voters whose preferences coincide with those of . may follow suit. Depending on the number of followers, the outcome could be better or worse for . than the outcome of truthful voting. A manipulative vote is ca作者: 創(chuàng)作 時間: 2025-3-29 08:08 作者: Ptosis 時間: 2025-3-29 15:19
When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers,Much of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium concept, is based on the assumption that players are expectation maximizers. It is known that if players are risk averse, games may no longer have Nash equilibria [11,6]. We show that作者: 無表情 時間: 2025-3-29 17:40 作者: 使人煩燥 時間: 2025-3-29 20:32
Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-642-16170-4Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: Texture 時間: 2025-3-30 00:28
0302-9743 Overview: 978-3-642-16169-8978-3-642-16170-4Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: ear-canal 時間: 2025-3-30 04:04
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4Braess‘s paradox; Hedonic games; Nash equilibrium; algorithmic game theory; auctions; coalition formation作者: MODE 時間: 2025-3-30 10:52
978-3-642-16169-8Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2010作者: LUMEN 時間: 2025-3-30 13:58 作者: 星星 時間: 2025-3-30 16:41
Lukas Schriewer,Daniel Reichertfeasible points is a polyhedral convex set while the cost function is non-linear; however, unlike that, the optimum is always attained at a vertex of this polytope. The convex cost function depends only on the initial endowments of the buyers. This formulation yields an easy simplex-like pivoting al作者: 使尷尬 時間: 2025-3-30 22:37 作者: Gastric 時間: 2025-3-31 04:09
Jonas Esch,Andrea Rettmann,Sabine Marzineakto change their strategies collectively, does not always exist in such games. We show, however, that partition equilibrium (introduced in [4] to model coalitions arising in a social context) always exists in general resource selection games, as well as how to compute it efficiently. In a partition e作者: 小說 時間: 2025-3-31 05:27
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-90948-1st-response dynamics where the noise level is tuned by a parameter .. Such a dynamics defines a family of ergodic Markov chains, indexed by ., over the set of strategy profiles. Our aim is twofold: On the one hand, we are interested in the expected social welfare when the strategy profiles are rando作者: Defense 時間: 2025-3-31 11:18 作者: 努力趕上 時間: 2025-3-31 16:21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04172-2quilibria that are far apart, or .-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. Motivated by this consideration, in this paper we define the notion of games that are ., meaning that all .-approxim作者: 遵循的規(guī)范 時間: 2025-3-31 19:17 作者: Merited 時間: 2025-3-31 22:17 作者: Esalate 時間: 2025-4-1 03:14 作者: 強行引入 時間: 2025-4-1 09:16
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39685-8 game is one where natural distributed dynamics, such as better-response dynamics, cannot enter .. We establish a novel link between such games and the existence of pure Nash equilibria in subgames. Specifically, we show that the existence of a . pure Nash equilibrium in every . implies the weak acy作者: 摻假 時間: 2025-4-1 10:59 作者: 脖子 時間: 2025-4-1 16:46 作者: Overdose 時間: 2025-4-1 21:16 作者: 哄騙 時間: 2025-4-2 01:58
,Soll man seinen Vorg?nger verklagen?,specified by an undirected edge-weighted graph: nodes are players, an outcome of the game is a partition of the nodes into coalitions, and the utility of a node is the sum of incident edge weights in the same coalition. We consider several natural stability requirements defined in the economics lite作者: 字的誤用 時間: 2025-4-2 04:03 作者: 初學者 時間: 2025-4-2 08:02
