標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; First International Burkhard Monien,Ulf-Peter Schroeder Conference proceedings 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel [打印本頁] 作者: 浮淺 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:07
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 主動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:51 作者: Fecundity 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:50
Conference proceedings 2008, in April/May 2008.?..The 28 revised full papes presented together with 3 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 60 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on routing and scheduling, markets, mechanism design, potpourri of games, solution concepts, and cost sharing..作者: 澄清 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-85281-6ften in the form of equilibrium concepts. There are several desiderata one might expect from an equilibrium concept: First and foremost it should be natural and convincing as a prediction of agent behavior. Then it should be . — all games should have it, because otherwise it is an incomplete predict作者: Rodent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:46
Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse,uter-simulated monopoly market over fifty time periods. The subjects are provided with a computerized short-run planning tool allowing them to check feasibility of any aspiration level for any set of feedback variables of the respective planning period. Our results fall into two categories, first, r作者: GLIB 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 14:02 作者: Definitive 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:05
Die innerbetriebliche Absatzorganisationsh routing. Each of . players in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by choosing one of . parallel links. Each player is restricted to transmit over a certain subset of links and desires to minimize his own transmission-time (latency). We study Nash equilibria of the game, i作者: cochlea 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:47
Absatzpolitische Entscheidungenre Price of Anarchy. In particular, we consider symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting class of networks with linearly independent paths, and establish two remarkable properties previously known only for parallel-link games. More precisely, we show that for arbitra作者: 高爾夫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:15
Absatzpolitische Entscheidungentween the cost of an equilibrium (a pure Nash equilibrium, and a strong equilibrium, respectively) to the cost of a social optimum..We consider scheduling on uniformly related machines. Here the atomic players are the jobs, and the delay of a job is the completion time of the machine running it, als作者: Throttle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:48
Absatzpolitische EntscheidungenA downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet, as we show in this paper, in some cases, NE does exhibit stability against coalitional deviations, in that the benefits from a joint deviation are bounded. In this sense, NE approximates . (SE) [6]..We provi作者: 2否定 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:54
Die innerbetriebliche Absatzorganisationand sell bandwidth at fixed prices subject to capacity constraints; consumers buy bandwidth between their sources and sinks so as to maximize their value from sending traffic minus the prices they pay to edges. We characterize the price of anarchy and price of stability in these “network pricing” ga作者: 松緊帶 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:37 作者: 捏造 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-93789-6ompeting flows. Analytical and experimental results show the relevance of the Window-game to the real TCP game and provide interesting insight on Nash equilibria of the respective network games. Furthermore, we propose a new algorithmic queue mechanism, called Prince, which at congestion makes a sca作者: 啞巴 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:01
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39686-5ertices of a bipartite graph and trade is allowed only between neighbors. In this model the graph is generated probabilistically, and each buyer is connected via preferential attachment to . sellers. We show that even though the tail of the degree distribution of the sellers gets heavier as . increa作者: 柱廊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:05
Kurvenkongruenzen auf einer ,,,ach (out of . resources) so that her selfish delay there is not much. The problem of “maintaining” global progress while allowing concurrent play is exactly what is examined and answered here. We examine two orthogonal settings : (i) A game where the players decide their moves without global informa作者: Excitotoxin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:41
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26466-9 in a resource-constrained environment. There have been some recent proposals to use incentive-based mechanisms (in particular, VCG) for routing in wireless ad-hoc networks, and some frugality bounds are known when the connectivity graph is essentially complete. We show frugality bounds for random g作者: 生意行為 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-98833-1cal . over two (identical) parallel .. We introduce a new measure of ., defined to be the expectation of the square of the maximum . on a link; we call it .. A . (.) is a stable state where no user can improve her (expected) latency by switching her mixed strategy; a .. is one that maximizes Quadrat作者: 男生戴手銬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:37
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-98833-1ppose, given a unit demand flow at Wardrop equilibrium, one increases the demand by . or removes an edge carrying only an .-fraction of flow. We study how the equilibrium responds to such an .-change..Our first surprising finding is that, even for linear latency functions, for every .>?0, there are 作者: 煩擾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:51 作者: 免除責(zé)任 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:43
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26465-2ell as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism i作者: Congeal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:20 作者: 極肥胖 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:31
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26465-2changed between two players in order to compute the value of a polynomial or rational function depending on an input distributed between the two players. We define a general algebraic model, where the involved functions can be computed with the natural operations additions, multiplications and divis作者: 柱廊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 15:41 作者: 聽寫 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 18:35 作者: 菊花 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:05 作者: Reservation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:17
MedR Schriftenreihe Medizinrechtmitations of the approximability of the problem is an important challenge. The purpose of this document is to review a set of results, which have contributed significantly, and currently are the state-of-art with respect to the polynomial time construction of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. . 作者: 慎重 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:18
The Search for Equilibrium Conceptsften in the form of equilibrium concepts. There are several desiderata one might expect from an equilibrium concept: First and foremost it should be natural and convincing as a prediction of agent behavior. Then it should be . — all games should have it, because otherwise it is an incomplete predict作者: 手勢(shì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:43 作者: 污點(diǎn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:28
Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Gamesmitations of the approximability of the problem is an important challenge. The purpose of this document is to review a set of results, which have contributed significantly, and currently are the state-of-art with respect to the polynomial time construction of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix 作者: 性別 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:54 作者: 追逐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:51 作者: 一再煩擾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:38 作者: MIRTH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:22
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling GamesA downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet, as we show in this paper, in some cases, NE does exhibit stability against coalitional deviations, in that the benefits from a joint deviation are bounded. In this sense, NE approximates . (SE) [6]..We provi作者: 平躺 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:03
Bertrand Competition in Networksand sell bandwidth at fixed prices subject to capacity constraints; consumers buy bandwidth between their sources and sinks so as to maximize their value from sending traffic minus the prices they pay to edges. We characterize the price of anarchy and price of stability in these “network pricing” ga作者: 價(jià)值在貶值 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:54 作者: 推遲 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:33 作者: Anecdote 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:05
Price Variation in a Bipartite Exchange Networkertices of a bipartite graph and trade is allowed only between neighbors. In this model the graph is generated probabilistically, and each buyer is connected via preferential attachment to . sellers. We show that even though the tail of the degree distribution of the sellers gets heavier as . increa作者: Mutter 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:16 作者: 不理會(huì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:12 作者: GROWL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:25 作者: Coronary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 17:24 作者: 單純 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 20:16 作者: 后天習(xí)得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:12
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Schedulingell as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism i作者: Genteel 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 06:23
Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognizeions in which truth-telling is always the best response of the players. The Revelation Principle says that one can focus on truthful implementations without loss of generality (if there is no truthful implementation then there is no implementation at all). Green and Laffont [1] showed that, in the s作者: accrete 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 08:48 作者: 蠟燭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:05 作者: MAIZE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:32
Die innerbetriebliche Absatzorganisationocial cost functions. For total latency cost, we show the tight result that the price of anarchy is essentially .. Hence, even for congested networks, when the traffic is linear in the number of players, Nash equilibria approximate the social optimum only by a factor of .. This efficiency loss is ca作者: AMEND 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 19:52
Absatzpolitische Entscheidungen dependence between the number of speeds and the .. For a set of machines of at most . speeds, the . turns out to be exactly .?+?1. The growth of the . for large numbers of related machines is therefore a direct result of the large number of potential speeds. We further consider a well known structu作者: 滑動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:00
Absatzpolitische Entscheidungens. (iii) .: the maximum possible damage ratio of an agent outside the coalition..This framework can be used to study the proximity between different solution concepts, as well as to study the existence of approximate SE in settings that do not possess any such equilibrium. We analyze these measureme作者: aesthetic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 04:25 作者: 殺蟲劑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 09:20
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-98833-1e in the demand can be unbounded, the path latency at equilibrium increases at most by a factor of (1?+?.).. The increase of the . is shown to be upper bounded by the same factor. Both bounds are shown to be tight..Let us remark that all our bounds are tight. For the multi-commodity case, we present作者: crucial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 15:29 作者: 濕潤(rùn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:29
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26465-2can be implemented in a non-truthful manner, or even if it can be implemented at all. This is in contrast to the fact that truthful implementability can be recognized efficiently, even when partial verification of the agents is allowed. Our results also show that there is no “simple” characterizatio作者: 情節(jié)劇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 00:34 作者: Schlemms-Canal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 04:33
The Influence of Link Restrictions on (Random) Selfish Routingocial cost functions. For total latency cost, we show the tight result that the price of anarchy is essentially .. Hence, even for congested networks, when the traffic is linear in the number of players, Nash equilibria approximate the social optimum only by a factor of .. This efficiency loss is ca作者: Delirium 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:50
The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited dependence between the number of speeds and the .. For a set of machines of at most . speeds, the . turns out to be exactly .?+?1. The growth of the . for large numbers of related machines is therefore a direct result of the large number of potential speeds. We further consider a well known structu作者: 冒失 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 12:30
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Gamess. (iii) .: the maximum possible damage ratio of an agent outside the coalition..This framework can be used to study the proximity between different solution concepts, as well as to study the existence of approximate SE in settings that do not possess any such equilibrium. We analyze these measureme作者: Wordlist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 16:36 作者: BAIL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 20:33
Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibriae in the demand can be unbounded, the path latency at equilibrium increases at most by a factor of (1?+?.).. The increase of the . is shown to be upper bounded by the same factor. Both bounds are shown to be tight..Let us remark that all our bounds are tight. For the multi-commodity case, we present作者: defuse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 23:45 作者: Modify 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 02:44
Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognizecan be implemented in a non-truthful manner, or even if it can be implemented at all. This is in contrast to the fact that truthful implementability can be recognized efficiently, even when partial verification of the agents is allowed. Our results also show that there is no “simple” characterizatio作者: Incorruptible 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 06:42
