作者: 寒冷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:23
Towards Characterizing the Deterministic Combinatorial Constrained Efficient Space,n that the valuation for the largest bundle is more than the budget for at least one of the players then the following are true. (a) VCG does not fulfill the basic properties of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individual rationality and Pareto optimality when the all-item bund作者: SUE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:42
On the Parameterized Complexity of Party Nominations, even on profiles that are both single-peaked and single-crossing. This strengthens previously established hardness results. We also show a polynomial time result for the related . problem on single-crossing elections.作者: 哪有黃油 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:37
https://doi.org/10.1007/b102376ters (e.g., a weighted sum, an OWA aggregator, a Choquet integral) and that a (near-)optimal solution can be efficiently determined when preferences are precisely known. For the multi-objective traveling salesman problem, we provide numerical results obtained with different query generation strategi作者: Cholecystokinin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:24 作者: 并入 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:55 作者: 商業(yè)上 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:11
Combining Local Search and Elicitation for Multi-Objective Combinatorial Optimization,timization problems with imprecise preferences. We assume that the decision maker’s preferences over solutions can be represented by a parameterized scalarizing function but the parameters are initially not known. In our approach, the parameter imprecision is progressively reduced by iteratively ask作者: 陪審團(tuán) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:42
Robustness of Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules,e extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the computational complexity of deciding how many such operations are necessary to change the set of winning committees. We also consider the counting variants of our problems, which can be interpreted as作者: Ige326 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:00 作者: Triglyceride 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:51 作者: 藝術(shù) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:24 作者: 廢除 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:48 作者: 畢業(yè)典禮 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:29 作者: 有毛就脫毛 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:44
On the Parameterized Complexity of Party Nominations,termine if, given a party ., it is possible for every party to nominate a candidate such that the nominee from . is a winner of the election that is obtained by restricting the votes to the nominated candidates. In previous work on this problem, proposed by?[.], it was established that . is NP-hard 作者: GRIEF 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:36
Gradient Methods for Solving Stackelberg Games, must be faced: in classical game theory, intervening agents were humans whose decisions are generally discrete and low dimensional. In AML, decisions are made by algorithms and are usually continuous and high dimensional, e.g. choosing the weights of a neural network. As closed form solutions for S作者: 苦澀 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:08 作者: 繁殖 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:58 作者: Aviary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:32
0302-9743 m, NC, USA, in October 2019. ?The 10 full papers presented together with 7 short papers were carefully selected from 31 submissions. The papers focus on algorithmic decision theory broadly defined, seeking to bring together researchers and practitioners coming from diverse areas of computer science,作者: 不溶解 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/b102376 operations are necessary to change the set of winning committees. We also consider the counting variants of our problems, which can be interpreted as computing the probability that the result of an election changes after a given number of random perturbations of the preference profile.作者: 性冷淡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:48 作者: nocturnal 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:52
https://doi.org/10.1007/b102376n for the egalitarian social welfare and the Nash product. Moreover, we focus on an extended model, based on directed social relationship graphs and undirected social trading graphs, and analyze the computational complexity of reaching a graph-envy-free allocation by trades with so-called . agents and without money.作者: Lasting 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 10:35 作者: 托人看管 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:05
,Integrating Operators’ Preferences into Decisions of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Multi-layer Decisionllows the logic of an operator and integrates its preferences through a Multi-Criteria Decision Aiding model. We also propose an incremental approach to elicit the operator’s preferences, in view of minimizing his/her cognitive fatigue during this task.作者: Multiple 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:36
Optimizing Social Welfare in Social Networks,n for the egalitarian social welfare and the Nash product. Moreover, we focus on an extended model, based on directed social relationship graphs and undirected social trading graphs, and analyze the computational complexity of reaching a graph-envy-free allocation by trades with so-called . agents and without money.作者: enchant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 21:07 作者: CORE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:34 作者: Mumble 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 04:42 作者: Cantankerous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:17 作者: synovium 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:30 作者: 兩棲動(dòng)物 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:41
Dependence in Buyer-Supplier Relationshipsclassification in a limited number of elicitation steps. We propose efficient strategies for computing the next question and show how its computation can be formulated as a linear program. We present experimental results showing the effectiveness of our approach.作者: staging 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:22 作者: unstable-angina 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:56
Gradient Methods for Solving Stackelberg Games,ures for solving this type of games using gradient methods. We study time and space scalability of both approaches and discuss in which situation it is more appropriate to use each of them. Finally, we illustrate their use in an adversarial prediction problem.作者: chronicle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:57
Interactive Elicitation of a Majority Rule Sorting Model with Maximum Margin Optimization,classification in a limited number of elicitation steps. We propose efficient strategies for computing the next question and show how its computation can be formulated as a linear program. We present experimental results showing the effectiveness of our approach.作者: BOOR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:53 作者: 強(qiáng)所 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:25
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31489-7artificial intelligence; automatic differentiation; autonomous agents; coalition formations; combinatori作者: Foment 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:24
978-3-030-31488-0Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019作者: Substance-Abuse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:40
https://doi.org/10.1007/b102376timization problems with imprecise preferences. We assume that the decision maker’s preferences over solutions can be represented by a parameterized scalarizing function but the parameters are initially not known. In our approach, the parameter imprecision is progressively reduced by iteratively ask作者: 信條 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 02:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/b102376e extent to which a committee can change after we add/remove/swap one approval, and we consider the computational complexity of deciding how many such operations are necessary to change the set of winning committees. We also consider the counting variants of our problems, which can be interpreted as作者: Carcinogen 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:38 作者: Missile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:04 作者: 半球 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:20 作者: 補(bǔ)助 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 22:27
https://doi.org/10.1007/b102376s the already known .-completeness of finding allocations with maximal utilitarian social welfare we prove that .-completeness is in general also given for the egalitarian social welfare and the Nash product. Moreover, we focus on an extended model, based on directed social relationship graphs and u作者: aggressor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:07
