標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 17th International C Michal Feldman,Hu Fu,Inbal Talgam-Cohen Conference proceedings 2022 Springer Nature Switze [打印本頁] 作者: Heel-Spur 時間: 2025-3-21 17:53
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics被引頻次
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics年度引用
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics讀者反饋
書目名稱Web and Internet Economics讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Nefarious 時間: 2025-3-21 23:51 作者: 越自我 時間: 2025-3-22 02:20
Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for?Imperfect Rationalityn computer science under the general umbrella of algorithmic mechanism design. Novel algorithmic properties and paradigms have been identified and studied in the literature. Our work stems from the observation that selfishness is different from rationality; agents will attempt to strategize whenever作者: Liberate 時間: 2025-3-22 07:03 作者: Initial 時間: 2025-3-22 09:33
Bayesian Persuasion in?Sequential Trialswe model by considering multi-phase trials with different experiments conducted based on the outcomes of prior experiments. In contrast to most of the literature, we consider the problem with constraints on signals imposed on the sender. This we achieve by fixing some of the experiments in an exogen作者: 急性 時間: 2025-3-22 16:01 作者: 感情 時間: 2025-3-22 19:26 作者: 揉雜 時間: 2025-3-22 22:20
The Optimality of?Upgrade Pricingricing—a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. Our approach exploits duality methods to identify conditions on the distribution of consumer types under which (a) each product is purchased by the same set of buyers as under separate monopoly pricing (though the transfers ca作者: 吹牛需要藝術(shù) 時間: 2025-3-23 02:46 作者: 無底 時間: 2025-3-23 06:24
On Symmetries in?Multi-dimensional Mechanism Designion of additive buyers with independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) item values, bundling all items together achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue-optimal item-symmetric mechanism..We further motivate this direction via fairness in ad auctions. In ad auction domai作者: Basal-Ganglia 時間: 2025-3-23 13:30 作者: 露天歷史劇 時間: 2025-3-23 15:26
Welfare-Preserving ,-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Lossegligible revenue loss. This is the first .-BIC to BIC transformation that preserves welfare and provides negligible revenue loss. The revenue loss bound is tight given the requirement to maintain social welfare. Previous .-BIC to BIC transformations preserve social welfare but have no revenue guara作者: anticipate 時間: 2025-3-23 18:08
Strategyproof Facility Location in?Perturbation Stable Instancesesults for ., we focus on . instances, where the optimal agent clustering is not affected by moving any subset of consecutive agent locations closer to each other by a factor at most .. We show that the optimal solution is strategyproof in .-stable instances, if it does not include any singleton clu作者: accomplishment 時間: 2025-3-23 22:25 作者: Coordinate 時間: 2025-3-24 02:26 作者: intercede 時間: 2025-3-24 10:14
Contract Design for?Afforestation Programson on farms through the lens of contract theory, designing conditional cash transfer schemes that encourage farmers to sustain tree growth. We capture the tree growth process as a Markov chain whose evolution is affected by the agent’s (farmer’s) choice of costly effort. The principal has imperfect 作者: 防水 時間: 2025-3-24 10:56
Relaxing the?Independence Assumption in?Sequential Posted Pricing, Prophet Inequality, and?Random Bially independent. Here, we assume that such events are only pair-wise independent; this gives rise to a much richer space of instances. Our aim has been to explore whether positive results are possible even under the more general assumptions. We show that this is indeed the case..Indicatively, we sh作者: Offset 時間: 2025-3-24 18:16 作者: modish 時間: 2025-3-24 19:22
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairnesstransfers and, therefore, a . in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported—rather than the true—values of the agents. Our main goal is to explore whether there exist mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria for every instance and, at the same time, provide fairness guarantees for作者: 謙卑 時間: 2025-3-25 00:43 作者: Rejuvenate 時間: 2025-3-25 06:19 作者: 信條 時間: 2025-3-25 07:42 作者: APEX 時間: 2025-3-25 14:43 作者: CROAK 時間: 2025-3-25 17:28 作者: RADE 時間: 2025-3-25 23:52
Improved Analysis of?RANKING for?Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in?the?Random Order ModelNKING algorithm for this problem introduced by Huang, Tang, Wu, and Zhang [.], who show that their algorithm has a competitive ratio of 0.6534. We show that assumptions in their analysis can be weakened, allowing us to replace their derivation of a crucial function . on the unit square with a linear作者: Devastate 時間: 2025-3-26 00:22 作者: 厚顏無恥 時間: 2025-3-26 05:13 作者: 可卡 時間: 2025-3-26 09:45
Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysisan equilibrium. Unfortunately, such a “Pigouvian” tax may also induce other, socially inefficient, equilibria. We observe that this social inefficiency may be unbounded, and study whether alternative tax structures may lead to milder losses in the worst case, i.e. to a lower price of anarchy. We sho作者: 積云 時間: 2025-3-26 13:43 作者: 細(xì)胞 時間: 2025-3-26 17:13
The Core of?Housing Markets from?an?Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up?Your Home?ion of an agent?. in a housing market?.: we show that it is .-hard to find an allocation in the core of . where (i) . receives a certain house, (ii) . does not receive a certain house, or (iii) . receives a house other than her own. We prove that the core of housing markets . in the following sense:作者: 枯燥 時間: 2025-3-27 00:52 作者: 惡意 時間: 2025-3-27 03:34
Mechanisms for?Trading Durable Goodsis often the case with books that can be read and later exchanged for unread ones. Other examples of such easily transferable durable goods include puzzles, video games and baby clothes..We introduce a model for the exchange of easily transferable durable goods. In our model, each agent owns a set o作者: biosphere 時間: 2025-3-27 05:59
Formal Barriers to?Simple Algorithms for?the?Matroid Secretary Problemand conjectured that a constant-competitive online algorithm exists. The conjecture still remains open despite substantial partial progress, including constant-competitive algorithms for numerous special cases of matroids, and an .-competitive algorithm in the general case..Many of these algorithms 作者: 侵略者 時間: 2025-3-27 09:57 作者: indifferent 時間: 2025-3-27 14:59
Threshold Tests as?Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and?Price of?Anarchye drawn i.i.d.?from a common prior. The principal aims to choose the better of the two products, but the quality of a product can only be estimated via a coarse-grained .: given a threshold ., the principal learns whether a product’s quality exceeds . or fails to do so..We study this selection probl作者: cardiac-arrest 時間: 2025-3-27 17:50 作者: 能得到 時間: 2025-3-27 22:52 作者: 傻 時間: 2025-3-28 04:11
0302-9743 pical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies..978-3-030-94675-3978-3-030-94676-0Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: Impugn 時間: 2025-3-28 09:51
Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysisan tax, obtaining tight lower and upper bounds in terms of a crucial parameter that we identify. We generalize our results to various scenarios that each offers an alternative to the use of a public road by private cars, such as ride sharing, or using a bus or a train.作者: Anthem 時間: 2025-3-28 14:18 作者: 莊嚴(yán) 時間: 2025-3-28 16:54
The Core of?Housing Markets from?an?Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up?Your Home?ket admits an allocation where . receives either ., or a house that she prefers to .; moreover, such an allocation can be found efficiently. We further show an analogous result in the . setting by proving that stable matchings in a one-sided market also respect improvement.作者: 會議 時間: 2025-3-28 20:41 作者: 古老 時間: 2025-3-28 23:26 作者: 雕鏤 時間: 2025-3-29 05:08
Formal Barriers to?Simple Algorithms for?the?Matroid Secretary Problemgorithms cannot resolve the matroid secretary conjecture. We initiate the study of impossibility results for frameworks to resolve this conjecture. We establish impossibility results for a natural class of greedy algorithms and for randomized partition algorithms, both of which contain known algorithms that resolve special cases.作者: 不愛防注射 時間: 2025-3-29 09:49
Strategyproof Facility Location in?Perturbation Stable Instancesistic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms suffer an unbounded approximation ratio in .-stable instances. Moreover, we prove that allocating the facility to a random agent of each optimal cluster is strategyproof and 2-approximate in 5-stable instances.作者: Traumatic-Grief 時間: 2025-3-29 13:02
Strategyproof Facility Location in?Perturbation Stable Instancesistic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms suffer an unbounded approximation ratio in .-stable instances. Moreover, we prove that allocating the facility to a random agent of each optimal cluster is strategyproof and 2-approximate in 5-stable instances.作者: 令人心醉 時間: 2025-3-29 15:35 作者: BOOM 時間: 2025-3-29 21:01
Contract Design for?Afforestation Programs contract can involve time-varying payments that are typically higher in earlier periods and may end early. We surveyed farmers partnered with an afforestation program in Uganda to collect data on tree maintenance costs and we derive the optimal payment contract for the reported costs.作者: myopia 時間: 2025-3-30 03:20
On the?Benefits of?Being Constrained When Receiving Signalsmore constrained receiver will always obtain (weakly) higher utility than a less constrained one. Unfortunately, without additional assumptions, the result does not hold when there are more than two states in the world, which we show with an explicit example.作者: 一再煩擾 時間: 2025-3-30 05:04 作者: syncope 時間: 2025-3-30 10:38
sentially nothing else than quantum measurement, but considered from the point of view of its physical mechanism and resolved in time. The present book is devot978-90-481-5422-7978-94-015-9566-7Series ISSN 0168-1222 Series E-ISSN 2365-6425 作者: panorama 時間: 2025-3-30 13:20 作者: TRAWL 時間: 2025-3-30 20:22 作者: 極小量 時間: 2025-3-30 23:10 作者: 同義聯(lián)想法 時間: 2025-3-31 03:10 作者: HARD 時間: 2025-3-31 08:39
Bayesian Persuasion in?Sequential Trialsres are determined by the interviewer. The non-determined experiments (signals) in the multi-phase trial are to be chosen by the sender in order to persuade the receiver best. With a binary state of the world, we start by deriving the optimal signaling policy in the only non-trivial configuration of作者: HILAR 時間: 2025-3-31 12:54 作者: 擔(dān)心 時間: 2025-3-31 13:54
The Optimality of?Upgrade Pricingnotone across types. The monotone MRS condition allows us to relax the earlier regularity assumption..Under both sets of conditions, we fully characterize the product bundles and prices that form the optimal upgrade pricing menu. Finally, we show that, if the consumer’s types are monotone, the selle作者: 安慰 時間: 2025-3-31 17:58 作者: 浮雕 時間: 2025-3-31 23:30 作者: 聲明 時間: 2025-4-1 02:55
On Symmetries in?Multi-dimensional Mechanism Designantee from worst-case to Bayesian settings, which circumvents strong impossibility results from these works, and then study this guarantee through the lens of symmetries, as any item-symmetric auction is also fair (by this definition). Observe that in this domain, bundling all items together corresp作者: angiography 時間: 2025-4-1 07:12 作者: Conjuction 時間: 2025-4-1 11:19
Welfare-Preserving ,-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss transformation runs a . and a . iteratively to make the mechanism Bayesian incentive compatible. We also analyze .-expected ex-post IC (.-EEIC) mechanisms?[.]. We provide a welfare-preserving transformation in this setting with the same revenue loss guarantee for uniform type distributions and give作者: Cognizance 時間: 2025-4-1 16:59 作者: 良心 時間: 2025-4-1 19:27 作者: 兵團(tuán) 時間: 2025-4-1 23:56 作者: Eviction 時間: 2025-4-2 05:05
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are . with respect to the underlying true values, while for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden we show that the corresponding allocations not only are . but also satisfy ., something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-stra作者: 噴出 時間: 2025-4-2 10:56
Towards a?Characterization of?Worst Case Equilibria in?the?Discriminatory Price Auctiondular valuations. We further present an improved upper bound of 4/3 for the special case where there exists a “high” demand bidder. Finally, we also study Bayes-Nash equilibria, and exhibit a separation result that had been elusive so far. Namely, already with two bidders, the Price of Anarchy for B作者: 貨物 時間: 2025-4-2 11:50
Towards a?Characterization of?Worst Case Equilibria in?the?Discriminatory Price Auctiondular valuations. We further present an improved upper bound of 4/3 for the special case where there exists a “high” demand bidder. Finally, we also study Bayes-Nash equilibria, and exhibit a separation result that had been elusive so far. Namely, already with two bidders, the Price of Anarchy for B作者: 組成 時間: 2025-4-2 16:59
Improved Analysis of?RANKING for?Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in?the?Random Order Modelomputationally an upper bound on our approach of 0.6688; any further progress beyond this bound will require either further weakening in the assumptions of . or a stronger analysis than that of Huang et al.作者: 假設(shè) 時間: 2025-4-2 21:48 作者: 后退 時間: 2025-4-3 03:35 作者: Contort 時間: 2025-4-3 05:45
Mechanisms for?Trading Durable Goodsand set, they are . (i.e., it is in the agents’ best interest to report their preferences truthfully) and they run in ...One challenge in developing mechanisms for our setting is that the supply and demand sets of the agents are updated after a trade cycle is executed. This makes constructing strate作者: foliage 時間: 2025-4-3 10:43
Threshold Tests as?Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and?Price of?Anarchy optimal strategy is to choose tests whose probability of passing is drawn uniformly from ...In our second interaction model, test difficulties are selected endogenously by the two firms. This corresponds to a setting in which the firms must commit to their testing (quality control) procedures befor作者: Debate 時間: 2025-4-3 12:28
Threshold Tests as?Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and?Price of?Anarchy optimal strategy is to choose tests whose probability of passing is drawn uniformly from ...In our second interaction model, test difficulties are selected endogenously by the two firms. This corresponds to a setting in which the firms must commit to their testing (quality control) procedures befor
